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PROPERTY POWER: PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS
AND THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF
SEMICONDUCTOR TECHNOLOGY
Kenneth J. Burchfiel*
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984' established a
new form of legal protection for the designs embodied in semicon-
ductor chips, differing in significant respects from the protection for
intellectual property earlier afforded under patent and copyright
law. In creating a statutory alternative to copyright and patent pro-
tection, Congress defined an intermediate standard of creativity re-
quired for mask work registration, between the "originality" re-
quirement for copyright registration2 and the "novelty, utility and
nonobviousness" standards for patentability.' It requires not only
that a mask work be "original,"' but also that it not merely consist
of designs that are "staple, commonplace, or familiar in the semicon-
ductor industry, or variations of such designs, combined in a way
that, considered as a whole, is not original.""
The Act provides a nonexclusive alternative to patent protection
o 1988 by Kenneth J. Burchfiel
* Sughrue, Mion, Zinn, Macpeak and Seas, Washington, D.C., practicing as a
Gaikokuho-Jimu-Bengoshi in Tokyo, Japan; A.B., 1973, Amherst College; J.D., 1977, Cor-
nell Law School. The present article was written during a recent fellowship at the Max-
Planck-Institut fir auslindisches und internationales Patent, Urheber, und Wettbewerbsrecht,
Munich, Federal Republic of Germany. I wish to thank the Institut for its generous support.
1. The Semiconductor Chip Act of Nov. 8, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, § 302, 98 Stat.
3347, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (Supp. I 1984) [hereinafter "Chip Act" or "The Act"].
2. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
3. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (Supp. 11 1984).
4. 17 U.S.C. § 902(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1984).
5. Id. § 902(b)(2).
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for semiconductor chips,6 recognized by Congress as patentable sub-
ject matter,7 but it explicitly establishes a lower standard for protec-
tion than the "nonobviousness" standard required to obtain a patent.
This article considers whether Congress may except semiconductor
chips from the general requirement that patentable articles be non-
obvious, in view of Supreme Court precedent indicating that the
nonobviousness requirement is constitutionally required for the issu-
ance of a valid patent for the same subject matter.
I. LEGAL PROTECTION OF SEMICONDUCTOR TECHNOLOGY BY
THE CHIP ACT
Semiconductor chips consist of circuits formed on a wafer of
pure semiconductor material (such as silicon) by impregnating or
"doping" the silicon substrate. This creates regions of semiconductor
material isolated by insulating material. The semiconducting regions
attach to conductors to form electronic circuits that perform a desired
function." Semiconductor chips typically consist of a sandwich of sev-
eral layers, connected in a three-dimensional network, and can con-
tain millions of individual semiconductor components in an area as
small as one-quarter inch square.'0
Masks are basic tools used in the manufacture of integrated cir-
cuits." Conventionally, circuit elements have been fabricated on
6. See infra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 46.
8. See infra note 34.
9. For a general description of the manufacture of semiconductor chips, see, e.g., H.R.
REP. No. 781, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 11-14 [hereinafter House Report]; S. REP. No. 98-425,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. at 2-4 [hereinafter Senate Report]; Copyright Protection for Imprinted
Design Patterns on Semiconductor Chips: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 28-31 (1979) (statement of L. Sevin, President, Mostek Corp.) [hereinafter 1979 Hear-
ing]; id. at 53-54 (statement of J. Finch, National Semiconductor Corp.); Copyright Protection
for Semiconductor Chips: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the
Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-28 (1983)
(s!atement of F. Dunlap, Jr., Corporate Counsel and Secretary, Intel Corp.) [hereinafter 1983
House Hearings]; and The Semiconductor Protection Chip Act of 1983: Hearing on S. 1201
Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 36-39 (1983) (statement of D. Schrader, Associate Register of
Copyrights for Legal Affairs) [hereinafter 1983 Senate Hearing].
10. See generally Newell, de Geus & Rohrer, Design Automation for Integrated Cir-
cuits, SCIENCE, Apr. 29, 1983, at 465, 466 [hereinafter Design Automation].
11. See 1979 Hearing, supra note 9, at 23 (statement of L. Sevin, President, Mostek
Corp.). Other chip manufacturers stressed that there is no distinction in principle between
masks and the tools used to fabricate any other manufactured product. See 1979 Hearing,
supra note 9, at 75 (statement of R. Shapiro, General Counsel, General Instrument Corp.);
1979 Hearing, supra note 9, at 53-54 (statement of J. Finch, National Semiconductor Corp.).
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semiconductor wafers using photolithographic techniques. Circuit
patterns are applied to the substrate using a template or "mask"
containing the image of the desired pattern of components for a sin-
gle layer of the final chip." The semiconductor chip structure is
built up layer by layer, each layer requiring a separate mask.
Engineering the masks needed to produce a typical semiconduc-
tor chip may require the investment of thousands of man hours and
several million dollars."3 The layout phase, in which the myriad in-
dividual components are exactly positioned by hand"' in the "topog-
raphy" of a layer, is the most time consuming and error-prone stage
of integrated circuit design,15 as well as the most expensive."' The
increasing complexity of chip design has been accompanied by
"skyrocketing" design costs,17 and the Chip Act is properly consid-
ered as a congressional attempt primarily to protect this most costly
phase of chip production. 8
12. Described in detail in Oldham, The Fabrication of Microelectronic Circuits, Sci.
AM., Sept. 1977, at 110 [hereinafter Microelectronic Circuits].
13. See House Report, supra note 9, at 2 (development costs of a single new chip can
reach $100 million); Senate Report, supra note 9, at 5.
14. The House Report based its economic analysis on hand layout performed by a de-
sign engineer, assuming that "trial and error is used to select the optimum layout" in a "time-
consuming and extremely costly" process. House Report, supra note 9, at 12. While com-
puter-assisted layout is possible in some circumstances, individual placement of circuit compo-
nents by skilled layout engineers is still used in "custom-designed" chips because hand layout
permits the greatest number of transistors to be placed in the smallest chip area. Design Auto-
mation, supra note 10, at 468. In addition to optimal speed and power, due to their small size
manually designed chips have the advantage of high manufacturing yield. See Microelectronic
Circuits, supra note 12, at 113.
15. See, e.g., Design Automation, supra note 10, at 468; House Report, supra note 9, at
12; 1979 Hearing, supra note 9, at 25 (statement of L. Sevin, President, Mostek Corp.).
16. See 1979 Hearing, supra note 9, at 26 (statement of L. Sevin, President, Mostek
Corp.). Designing a chip can require hundreds of man-years and millions of dollars and is
much more costly than the subsequent translation of a layout into working masks, which is
routinely done using computers. After masks are produced, the fabrication of a chip can take
only weeks and cost thousands of dollars. See Design Automation, supra note 10, at 465.
17. 1979 Hearing, supra note 9, at 40 (statement of A. Grove, President, Intel Corp.).
The advantage of market lead time had been considered adequate to repay the relatively low
development costs of the early 1970's, but the limited period of exclusivity available before
copied products reached the market was increasingly regarded as insufficient to offset 1979
design costs, which had increased twenty-fold. 1979 Hearing, supra note 9, at 31-40. See also
Kastenmeier & Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: A Swamp or
Firm Ground? 33 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 110, 136-36 (1986) [hereinafter Kastenmeier]; but see
1979 Hearing, supra note 9, at 70 (statement of J. Finch, National Semiconductor Corp.);
1979 Hearing, supra note 9, at 75-76 (statement of R. Shapiro, General Counsel, General
Instrument Corp.).
18. The House Report explains that the mask work protected by the Chip Act "essen-
tially is the layout determination. ... House Report, supra note 9, at 13-14. It emphasizes
that "[flitting these transistors into that small space, placing them so that the resulting device
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Design costs can be entirely eliminated by photographically
copying and duplicating the layout of a chip on the market, a process
requiring only a specimen chip, a camera capable of 400 times mag-
nification and "a certain amount of patience."19 By avoiding the lay-
out phase, it is possible t6 produce a semiconductor chip in as little
as three months, at a cost of less than $50,000. Congressional con-
demnation of the exact photographic duplication of chip designs, de-
nounced as "piracy," and viewed as "a devastating disincentive to
innovating research and development," 21 was in large measure re-
sponsible for enactment of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act.
The basic purpose of the Act was to counter "the unfair competition
of competing firms which do not bear the tremendous research and
development costs" involved in chip design. 2
A. The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act"
Congress sought to achieve this objective, not under existing
patent and copyright law,"4 but by fashioning a sui generis
operates efficiently and economically, is a fine art and also a costly one . House Report,
supra note 9, at 2.
19. 1983 Senate Hearing, supra note 9, at 78-79 (statement of C. Layton, Vice Presi-
dent of Operations, Intersil Corp.). See also Senate Report, supra note 9, at 4.
20. See, e.g., House Report, supra note 9, at 2; 1979 Hearing, supra note 9, at 27
(statement of L. Sevin, President, Mostek Corp.); ef. Senate Report, supra note 9, at 5 (copy-
ing cost estimated to be $50,000 to $100,000). These estimates of time and cost were widely
accepted in Congress during debate of the 1984 Act. See 130 CONG. REC. H5494-96 (daily ed.
June 11, 1983).
21. House Report, supra note 9, at 2-3; see also Senate Report, supra note 9, at 5.
22. House Report, supra note 9, at 3. The inability of United States chip designers to
recover development costs because of foreign chip copying was repeatedly cited in debate as a
reason for enacting chip protection legislation. See 130 CONG. REC. H5491-97 (daily ed. June
11, 1984) (House debate on H.R. 5525).
23. For a more general discussion of the Act, see D. LADD, D. LEIBOWITZ & B.
JOSEPH, PROTECTION FOR SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP MASKS IN THE UNITED STATES, 8 IIC
STUDIES (Munich, 1986) (hereinafter LADD]; Kastenmeier, supra note 17; Note,
Semiconductor Chip Protection: Changing Roles for Copyright and Competition, 71 VA. L.
REV. 249 (1985); Wilson & LaBarre, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: A
Preliminary Analysis, 67 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 57 (1985); 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT ch. 18 (1985) (hereinafter 3 M. NIMMER].
24. The close relationship of the Chip Act to the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§
101-810 (1982), is indicated both by numerous verbatim quotations from the parent statute,
and by the extended legislative deliberation of copyright protection for semiconductor products.
The original chip protection bill, H.R. 1007, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), would have pro-
vided copyright protection for photographic masks and imprinted patterns in chips as pictorial,
graphic and sculptural works, their purely utilitarian function notwithstanding. The copyright
model was followed in subsequent bills both in the House and Senate including H.R. 7207,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 3117, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 1028, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983); and S. 1201, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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statute 5 granting the owner of a "mask work""6 the exclusive right
to both reproduce the mask work in any fashion2 and import or
distribute a semiconductor chip product in which the mask work is
embodied, s for a period of ten years from the date of registration or
first commercial exploitation anywhere in the world, whichever is
first. 9 Subject to this greatly shortened period of protection, 0 the
Chip Act establishes exclusive rights of reproduction generally simi-
lar to those afforded by the Copyright Act. 1 Apart from the short-
During its deliberations on H.R. 1028, the House subcommittee became convinced that
extension of copyright protection would be "extremely unwise" because of its potential for
confusion and distortion of the established body of copyright law. See 130 CONG. REc. H5492
(daily ed. June 11, 1984) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier); House Report, supra note 9, at 7,
10. Consequently, the subcommittee substituted the sui generis approach of H.R. 5525, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), which was adopted by the full House. House Report, supra note 9, at
16-17.
When it became clear that the House would refuse to provide mask work protection
under copyright law, the Senate agreed to the sui generis approach, substituting a compromise
amendment substantially corresponding to H.R. 5525 for S. 1201. See 130 CONG. REC.
S12923 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1984) (statement of Sen. Mathias). The difference in approach was
regarded as more of form than substance, since the essential provisions of both the House and
Senate bills were similar. Id.; see also House Report, supra note 9, at 7-8.
The amendments to H.R. 5525 contained in the House-Senate compromise are discussed
in the Senate Explanatory Memorandum on the Mathias-Leahy Amendment to S. 1201, 130
CONG. REc. S12916 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1984) [hereinafter Senate Explanatory Memorandum]
and the House Explanatory Memorandum of the Senate Amendment to H.R. 6163, Title III,
as Considered by the House of Representatives, 130 CONG. REC. E4432 (daily ed. Oct. 10,
1984) [hereinafter House Explanatory Memorandum], which taken together constitute an "in-
formal conference report" on the final language of the compromise version. House Explana-
tory Memorandum, 130 CONG. REC. at E4432. The compromise version was enacted as Title
III of H.R. 6163, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), an omnibus intellectual property reform bill. A
comprehensive discussion of the procedural history of the Act is provided in Kastenmeier,
supra note 17, at 117-23.
25. The relative merits of copyright and sui generis protection are discussed in the
House Report, supra note 9, at 5-11. The Senate reached opposite conclusions on the question
of sui generis protection in its discussion of S. 1201, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. See Senate Report,
supra note 9, at 12-14.
26. The definition of a "mask work" is narrowly drawn to the final chip topography,
i.e., the images corresponding to the "predetermined, three-dimensional pattern" present in the
layers of a semiconductor chip. 17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1984).
27. Id. § 905(1). The Act creates the exclusive right to reproduce a mask work in the
form of a chip as well as masks or mask designs in the form of computer tapes or other
embodiments. See House Report, supra note 9, at 20.
28. 17 U.S.C. § 905(2) (Supp. 11 1984).
29. Id. § 904.
30. The copyright term is generally the lifetime of an author plus fifty years, 17 U.S.C.
§ 302(a) (1982), subject to a number of exceptions. Id. §§ 302(b)-305.
31. See House Report, supra note 9, at 20; 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982). It is noteworthy
that Congress did not include in the Chip Act a right corresponding to the exclusive right "to
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work" granted by 17 U.S.C. § 106(2)(1982), presumably due to the extensive reverse engineering exception included in the Chip
Act. See infra note 32.
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ened duration of protection, the exclusive rights provided by the Act
are subject to significant limitations, permitting "reverse engineer-
ing" of protected chips 2 and immunizing the "innocent" infringer,"a
both of which expressly depart from prevailing copyright standards.
Because semiconductor chips are patentable subject matter,"'
the Chip Act's sui generis form of protection necessarily overlaps the
protection available for chips or mask works under the Patent Act.3"
However, the Chip Act does not merely duplicate patent protection86
for these articles of manufacture. The coverage the Chip Act offers is
limited by the statutory definition of a "mask work" 7 and the
requirement of physical fixation of the mask work in a semicon-
ductor chip product. 88 Other limitations include citizenship require-
32. In an important divergence from copyright law, the Chip Act provides that it is not
an infringement of the rights conferred by the Act for "a person to reproduce the mask work
solely for the purpose of teaching, analyzing, or evaluating the concepts or techniques embod-
ied in the mask work or the circuitry, logic flow, or organization of components used in the
mask work." 17 U.S.C. § 906(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1984). Furthermore, the Act permits a person
who performs such an analysis of a mask work "to incorporate the results of such conduct in
an original mask work which is made to be distributed." Id. § 906(a)(2).
33. Id. § 907(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
34. As defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982), patentable subject matter includes "any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof." This section has been construed broadly to include "anything new
under the sun that is made by man," Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980), and
it is scarcely disputable that semiconductor chip products and mask works are included in the
expansive statutory definition of "manufacture." See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 9, at
64 (statement of G. Mossinghoff, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks).
35. 17 U.S.C. § 912(a) (Supp. 11 1984) provides that nothing in the Chip Act shall
affect any right or remedy under title 35, the codification of the Patent Act of 1952, as
amended. The legislative history emphasizes that the Chip Act "has no preemptive or super-
seding effect upon other, more general legislation which may affect the semiconductor industry,
e.g., unfair trade practice laws or patent laws." Senate Explanatory Memorandum, supra
note 24, at S12918; House Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 24, at E4433.
36. The basic patent term is seventeen years from the issue date, 35 U.S.C. § 154
(1982), which may be extended in certain circumstances to "restore" time lost in regulatory
review, e.g., of patented drugs. Id. §§ 155-156 (Supp. 11 1984). The exclusive rights granted
by the Chip Act are significantly more restricted than the exclusive right to "make, use or sell"
a patented invention. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1982). A patentee can sue users of a product made
or sold by an infringer, unlike a mask work owner, who lacks the power to recover from
persons who use a pirated chip, without copying, manufacturing or selling it, e.g., by using it
in a factory as a part of a computerized machine. See House Report, supra note 9, at 21 n.40.
37. See supra note 26. While a patent can protect chip design at any level of abstrac-
tion, including logical function, electronic circuitry or general organization, protection under
the Act extends only to definite physical configurations of metallic, insulating or semiconductor
material, i.e., the layout or "topography" of the chip.
38. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901 (a)(3), 902(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1984). See House Report, supra note 9,
at 16-17. No comparable requirement of an actual reduction to practice of an invention is
imposed under patent law. See Dolbear v. American Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1, 535-36 (1888);
Skil Corp. v. Lucerne Prods., Inc., 684 F.2d 346, 350 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991
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ments3  and the express prohibition against protection for "ideas."'
B. The Originality Standard
The Chip Act's most radical departure from established intel-
lectual property law is its unprecedented allowance of exclusive
rights in a utilitarian article' that does not meet the standards of
utility,' novelty' and nonobviousness," all of which are required
for patentability.' 5 Recognizing that mask works and chips require
legal protection, but rejecting the patent model on the assumption
that few, if any, mask works would satisfy the nonobviousness re-
quirement,"6 Congress instead adopted the copyright standard,'" ex-
pressly conditioning registration of a mask work upon the require-
ment that a mask work be "original.""
(1982); Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. Montedison, S.p.A., 664 F.2d 356, 362-63 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982).
39. 17 U.S.C. §§ 902(a), 914 (Supp. 11 1984).
40. Id. § 902(c). This limitation is identical to that contained in the Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. § 102(b) (1982), and reinforces the restriction of protectable subject matter to particu-
lar layout topography, rather than more abstract levels of chip design.
41. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. A principal reason for the enactment of
sui generis chip protection legislation was the conviction in the House that copyright protection
should not be extended to mask works, which are integral parts of a manufacturing process
and are purely utilitarian objects. See House Report, supra note 9, at 3-4, 6, 8-9; 130 Cong.
Rec. H5492 (daily ed. June 11, 1984) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). See generally Kas-
tenmeier, supra note 17, at 118-22.
42. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
43. Id. §§ 101-102.
44. Id. § 103 (Supp. I 1984).
45. See infra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
46. The House Report concludes that patent and copyright law offer little protection
against misappropriation of layout designs:
Patent law can protect the basic electronic circuitry for new microprocessors or
other new such products. But patent law does not protect the particular layouts
and design work by the different chip manufacturers in adapting those elec-
tronic circuits for a particular industrial purpose, because the creativity involved
does not rise to the inventive level required by the patent laws. Yet, it is those
layouts and design works that consume the resources of the innovating firms and
that are copied by free riders.
House Report, supra note 9, at 3 (citing 1983 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 17 (statement
of G. Mossinghoff, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks)). The Senate agreed that patent
protection for chips is "neither adequate nor always appropriate" and that "[als a practical
matter, the layout of a chip, as embodied in a mask, will rarely, if ever, satisfy this standard of
invention. A chip may be the product of millions of dollars and thousands of hours effort, but
it is the result of hard work, not 'invention.' " Senate Report, supra note 9, at 8 (quoting the
unpublished statement of A. Miller, Professor of Law, Harvard University, 1983 Senate
Hearing, supra note 9).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982).
48. Id. § 902(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1984).
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The legislative history indicates that the originality requirement
of section 902(b)(1) is to be construed in accordance with established
copyright precedent." The originality standard does not include re-
quirements of novelty, ingenuity or aesthetic merit,50 but instead re-
quires only that the work for which registration is sought be original
in the limited sense that it originates with its author and is not a
copy of an existing work.5'
In contrast to the basic patent standard,52 copyright originality
does not require novelty, and an independently created work that
exactly corresponds to a pre-existing work could be copyrighted,
since it is not copied.53 Furthermore, the prohibition against "copy-
ing" is a limited restriction, since even methodically exact copies,
such as reproductions of art works in the public domain, are often
copyrightable; in such cases the originality standard may be satisfied
by a mere distinguishable variation from the original, such as an
involuntary mistake in an effort to exactly duplicate the model.
54
49. As initially drafted, H.R. 5525, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), contained the definition
that "a mask work is 'original' if it is the independent creation of an author who did not copy
it from another source." Id. § 901(4). The House Report states that this section "adopts the
essence of the customary copyright law concept of originality and applies it to mask works, to
the extent it is appropriate and feasible to do so." House Report, supra note 9, at 17. The
Senate-House compromise amendment deleted this provision, without explanation in either the
House or Senate Explanatory Memorandum. In view of the detailed explanation of other less
significant changes provided in the Explanatory Memoranda, it is likely that section 901(4)
was viewed as superfluous, and that this amendment was not intended to modify the copyright
standard carried over into the Chip Act. Professor Nimmer suggests that the section may have
been deleted because of its reference to an "author," which is inconsistent with the sui generis
nature of the Act. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 23, 18.03[B] at 18-9, n.8.
50. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976). See Schroeder v. William
Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir. 1977); Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moutrie Mfg.
Co., 421 F.2d 279, 281 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970); Dan Kasoff, Inc. v.
Novelty Jewelry Co., 309 F.2d 745, 746 (2d Cir. 1962); Rushton v. Vitale, 218 F.2d 434, 435
(2d Cir. 1955); Jeweler's Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 F. 83, 88 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922).
51. See Kamar Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 1981);
Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 n.5 (9th Cir.
1977); Novelty Textile Mills v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1093 n.3 (2d Cir. 1977);
L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
857 (1976); Puddu v. Buonamici Statuary, Inc., 450 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1971); Alfred Bell
& Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951). See generally I M.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, 1.06[A], at 1-37 (1985) [hereinafter 1 M. NIMMER].
52. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (1982).
53. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954); Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont,
458 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir. 1972); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49,
53-54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669 (1936); Fred Fischer, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F.
145, 150-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
54. See, e.g., Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 34-35 (2d
Cir. 1982); Alfred Bell & Co., 191 F.2d at 105; Gerlach-Barklow Co. v. Morris & Bendien,
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This minimal requirement" stems from the rule formulated by Jus-
tice Holmes in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,5" sus-
taining the copyrightability of circus advertising posters:
The copy is the personal reaction of an individual upon nature.
Personality always contains something unique. It expresses its
singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art
has in it something irreducible, which is one man's alone. That
something he may copyright unless there is a restriction in the
words of the act.57
Construed according to copyright precedent, the originality
standard of the Chip Act arguably imposes a very low threshold
standard for mask work registration, requiring neither novelty nor
significant intellectual effort. However, in denying protection to de-
signs that are staple, commonplace or familiar in the semiconductor
industry, or variations of such designs, combined in a way that, con-
sidered as a whole, are not original," the Act imposes a further re-
quirement for registration that is not found in the copyright statute.
The legislative history indicates that
the Committee desired to prevent public domain material from
being usurped and turned into proprietary rights. There is a
fundamental congressional policy against "recapturing" works
in the public domain; this legislation pays careful heed to that
policy. Accordingly, section 902(b)(2) prevents mere staple and
commonplace designs from being taken out of the public
domain.59
Inc., 23 F.2d 159, 161 (2d Cir. 1927); Alva Studios v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265, 267
(S.D.N.Y. 1959). But see Sherry Mfg. Co. v. Towel King of Florida, Inc., 753 F.2d 1565
(11th Cir. 1985); Gracen v. Bradford Exchange, 698 F.2d 300, 305 (7th Cir. 1983); Durham
Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536
F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976).
55. The threshold quantum of originality required to sustain a valid copyright has been
variously described. See, e.g., Durham Indus., 630 F.2d at 910 ("minimal"); L. Batlin & Son,
536 F.2d at 490 ("concededly ...low"); Puddu v. Buonamici Statuary, Inc., 450 F.2d 401,
402 (2d Cir. 1971) ("modest"); Dan Kasoff, 309 F.2d at 746 ("a faint trace"); Peter Pan
Fabrics, Inc. v. Dan River Mills, 295 F. Supp. 1366, 1368 (S.D.N.Y.) ("very modest"), affd
per curiam, 415 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1969). See generally Olson, Copyright Originality, 48
Mo. L. REV. 29, 46-55 (1983); Study No. 3, The Meaning of "Writings" in the Copyright
Clause of the Constitution, Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 93-101 (1960) (hereinafter Writings]; Dworkin,
Originality in the Law of Copyright, 11 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 60 (1962); and I M.
NIMMER, supra note 51, 1.08[C][1l.
56. 188 U.S. 249 (1903).
57. Id. at 250.
58. 17 U.S.C. § 902(b)(2) (Supp. 11 1984).
59. House Report, supra note 9, at 19.
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In accordance with the legislative purpose of withholding pro-
tection from works already in the public domain, registration of an
exact duplication that is not copied from an extant mask work would
presumably be "staple" and thus denied validity, even if original in
the sense of copyright law. For this reason, section 902(b)(2) imposes
a novelty requirement conceptually distinct from copyright
originality.
The House Report also suggests a third requirement of "some
minimum of creativity to qualify a mask work for protection under
the Act."6 While endorsing this suggestion, the later legislative his-
tory acknowledges that "it is impossible to quantify a creativity stan-
dard precisely and objectively." It explains that the purpose of sec-
tion 902(b)(2) is
to weed out mere insubstantial or trivial variations on prior
mask works and to allow protection of new mask works in the
creation of which their owners have expended substantial toil
and investment, and which contain more than insubstantial var-
iations on the prior mask work art.61
Whether the Chip Act is viewed as incorporating or modifying
the copyright originality requirement,62 there is clear evidence from
both the originality standard imposed by the Act and its legislative
history that "clearly a mask work need not meet the nonobviousness
requirements of 35 U.S.C. section 103," the basic standard imposed
under patent law.6"
II. THE PATENTABILITY STANDARD OF NONOBVIOUSNESS AS A
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION
Enactment of chip protection legislation was motivated by the
dilemma that chip designs, although patentable subject matter, do
60. House Report, supra note 9, at 19.
61. Senate Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 24, at S12917. The "creativity" re-
quirement in copyright law is derived from the constitutional requirement of a "writing," and
is discussed infra notes 143-44 and 167.
62. Nimmer considers that section 902(b) does not constitute a departure from accepted
copyright standards of originality. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 23, 18.03[B], at 18-8 to 18-11.
Ladd, on the other hand, concludes that whatever the creativity standard established by the
Act, it would appear to fall somewhere between the patent standard of inventiveness and the
copyright standard of originality. LADD, supra note 23, at 38. This view is shared by Wilson
& LaBarre, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: A Preliminary Analysis, 67 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'y 57, 78-79 (1985).
63. Senate Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 24, at S12917; House Report, supra
note 9, at 19.
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not generally meet the nonobviousness standard for patentability."
At the same time, purely utilitarian mask works were considered be-
yond the ambit of copyright protection.6 5 To protect this most valua-
ble and innovative form of intellectual property from "piracy" with-
out disturbing the established foundations of copyright and patent
law, Congress created the sui generis Chip Act model, which pro-
vided copyright-like protection for the first time to useful articles."'
In establishing parallel protection under the Act for a very restricted
class of patentable subject matter,67 Congress provided more limited
exclusive rights than afforded by either copyrights or patents. How-
ever, Congress made the exclusive rights much easier to obtain and
enforce than under existing patent law.
Explaining that "balancing" of the public interest in free access
to unpatented inventions with the mask innovator's need to recover
development costs was necessary," Congress struck this balance by
limiting the scope of exclusive rights granted," permitting extensive
reverse engineering70 and shortening the term of protection." The
result was a restriction on exclusive rights in comparison with those
available under a patent and copyright. However, the Act eliminates
the patent requirements of nonobviousness7' and prior art examina-
tion," providing unprecedented remedies74 and enforcement advan-
tageS75 in comparison with patent law.
64. See supra note 46.
65. See infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 24-25.
67. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
68. See House Report, supra note 9, at 4-5, 8-9. See generally Kastenmeier, supra note
17, at 115-17, 147-50.
69. See supra notes 36-37.
70. See supra note 32.
71. See supra notes 30 and 36.
72. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
73. Under 35 U.S.C. § 131 (1982), examination of a patent application is required to
ensure that formal disclosure requirements are met, and that the claimed invention is novel
and nonobvious as compared to the prior art. Although the Chip Act refers to "examining" an
application for mask work registration, 17 U.S.C. § 908(e) (Supp. I 1984), it is clear from the
legislative history that the Copyright Office is not required to "examine" the application in the
sense of evaluating the novelty, originality or creativity of a mask work in comparison with
"prior art" mask works, in order to determine if the mask work meets the statutory standard
of originality. See House Report, supra note 9, at 25; Senate Explanatory Memorandum,
supra note 24, at S12917.
74. Remedies such as statutory damages, impounding of infringing products and equip-
ment, and discretionary attorney's fees are unknown in patent enforcement. 17 U.S.C. § 911
(c), (e), (f).
75. The copyright infringement model is "carried forward" into the Chip Act by 17
U.S.C. § 910(a) (Supp. 11 1984). See House Report, supra note 9, at 25-26. A prima facie
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This article addresses the issue of whether Congress could strike
such a balance consistent with article I, section 8, clause 8 of the
Constitution," which enumerates the basic legislative power "to pro-
mote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries."'77 Although Congress considered its consti-
tutional power to enact semiconductor protection legislation under
the copyright78 and commerce clauses,7 9 the legislative history of the
Chip Act fails to disclose similar congressional consideration of the
patent power as construed by the courts.8" This article addresses the
question of whether the Constitution affirmatively requires a stan-
dard of nonobviousness or its equivalent as a threshold limitation for
the grant of exclusive rights in a useful article. 1
A. The Statutory Standard of Nonobviousness
To satisfy the statutory standard for patentability, an inven-
case of copyright infringement can be established by proof of access and substantial similarity
to the copyrighted work, which shifts the burden of proof to the defendant to show indepen-
dent derivation or to establish another defense. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 23, 13.011B]. In
conjunction with the presumption of registration validity, 17 U.S.C. § 908(f) (Supp. 11 1984),
the adoption of enforcement procedures from copyright law makes rights in a registered mask
work significantly easier to enforce than corresponding patent rights. See, e.g., 1979 Hearing,
supra note 9, at 52, 54 (statement of J. Finch, National Semiconductor Corp.); 1979 Hearing,
supra note 9, at 58 (statement of J. Early, Director of Research and Development, Fairchild
Camera and Instrument Corp.); Note, Semiconductor Chip Protection: Changing Roles for
Copyright and Competition, 71 VA. L. REV. 249, 293 n.275 (1985).
76. Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution will hereinafter be cited in its
entirety as the "intellectual property clause."
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
78. In distinction to "patent clause," the term "copyright clause" is used herein to refer
to that portion of the intellectual property clause which provides Congress with the power "to
promote the progress of science . . . by securing for limited times to authors . . . the exclusive
right to their ...writings .. " See infra note 96.
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
80. The constitutional limitation of the patent power is acknowledged in the Senate
Report, supra note 9, at 8, but Congress does not appear to have considered whether such an
affirmative limitation would apply to the exercise of the copyright power or commerce power
to protect a "useful discovery" such as a semiconductor chip or mask work. See generally
Kastenmeier, supra note 17, at 113-17 (discussion of constitutional limitations without men-
tion of affirmative threshold limit).
81. Apart from consideration of the scope of the copyright and commerce powers, legis-
lative concern with possible constitutional infirmities focused on whether the Act impermissibly
grants retroactive rights. See House Report, supra note 9, at 29-30; Senate Report, supra note
9, at 26-29. The present article does not address this question.
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tion8" must be both new88 and useful.8" In addition, a useful inven-
tion that is novel in the sense that it is not identically described in a
single effective prior art reference will be denied patentability "if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains." 8
The critical nonobviousness standard requires that in addition to
novelty, a minimum or threshold difference exist between an inven-
tion for which a patent is sought and the prior art existing at the
time the invention was made. The standard is the codification 8 of
the doctrine of "patentable invention" judicially developed over the
previous century.87
Despite its seemingly subjective character, the nonobviousness
requirement rests on an essentially objective comparison. The semi-
nal decision in Graham v. John Deere Co.88 establishes that in eval-
uating the obviousness of an invention,
the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; dif-
ferences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be
ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art
resolved. . . . Such secondary considerations as commercial
82. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) defines an "invention" as "any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof."
83. 35 U.S.C. § 101-102 (1982). See generally Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar Co., 772
F.2d 1570, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Structural Rubber Prods. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749
F.2d 707, 715-16 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
84. The utility requirement is expressed in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982), and has been judi-
cially construed to require that an application as filed disclose a practical use for the invention
claimed where a use for the invention would not be obvious. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S.
519 (1966). When a properly claimed invention meets at least one stated objective, utility
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is clearly shown. See Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 958
(Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835 (1984).
85. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (Supp. 11 1984). Section 103 provides that "[platentability shall not
be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made."
86. Although novelty and utility have been statutory requirements for patentability since
the first United States patent act, Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, the nonobviousness
standard was first explicitly included as a statutory prerequisite in the comprehensive 1952
revision of the patent statute, Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792, 798.
87. In Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966), the Supreme Court concluded
that section 103 did not establish a new standard of patentable invention, but was intended
merely as a codification of the general condition of patentability formulated in Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851) and applied in the following century.
88. 383 U.S. at 1. The first three Supreme Court cases construing the 1952 patent act,
Graham; Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chem. Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) (decided together with Gra-
ham); and United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966), collectively cited as the "trilogy,"
provide the most pertinent guidance from the Supreme Court to date in construing the nonob-
viousness requirement.
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success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.,
might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding
the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia
of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries may have
relevancy. 9
Resolution of the ultimate legal question of obviousness90 requires
consideration of the specific differences between the claimed inven-
tion and the closest prior art. While often elusive in application, the
obviousness standard has the decided advantage of an objective, fac-
tual basis, separating the issue of patentability from more subjective
considerations such as the intrinsic importance of the invention9" or
the subjective state of mind of the inventor,92 which led to confused,
if not oracular, interpretations of the "patentable invention
standard."98
B. The "Constitutional" Requirement
The constitutional basis for patent and copyright legislation has
89. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18 (citation omitted).
90. Obviousness is a question of law, and the underlying inquiries mandated by Gra-
ham are questions of fact. Id. at 17. See also Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d
1530, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
91. See, e.g., Great At. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Co., 340 U.S. 147,
154 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring) for an illustration of the application of a purely subjec-
tive nonstatutory standard, i.e., whether an invention is a "gadget" or makes "a distinctive
contribution to scientific knowledge." Id.
92. See, e.g., Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941)
(invention to be patentable must evidence "the flash of creative genius"). At least one purpose
in creating the statutory nonobviousness standard was to overrule this construction of the re-
quirement for patent validity. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 15. The legislative history on this
point is summarized in Note, The Standard of Patentability-Judicial Interpretation of Sec-
tion 103 of the Patent Act, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 306, 310-12 (1963).
93. Judge Rich of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has described the vagar-
ies of the "undefinable concept of 'invention' " and the improvement wrought by substituting
the nonobviousness criterion, concluding "[tihere is a vast difference between basing a decision
on exercise of the inventive or creative faculty, or genius, ingenuity, patentable novelty, flashes,
surprises and excitement, on the one hand, and basing it on nonobviousness to one of ordinary
skill in the art on the other." Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393,
406 (1960). See also Rich, The Vague Concept of 'Invention' as Replaced by Section 103 of
the 1952 Patent Act, 8 IDEA 136 (1964); Rich, Laying the Ghost of the 'Invention' Require-
ment, 1 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J. 26 (1972). See generally Note, After Black Rock: New Tests of
Patentability-The Old Tests of Invention, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 123 (1970); Balluff, Do
Recent Supreme Court Opinions Raise the Standard of Invention, and Are Lower Courts
Misinterpreting Such Opinions? 34 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 847 (1952); Weklind, No Valid Pat-
ents? U.S. Supreme Court Trends in Jungerson v. Ostby & Barton Company, 31 J. PAT.




traditionally been found in the intellectual property clause.94 In Gra-
ham, the Supreme Court not only sustained the 1952 Patent Act
revision as supported by the article I, section 8 grant of legislative
power," but it also indicated that the nonobviousness standard is
sufficiently rigorous to satisfy an express constitutional limitation on
the congressional power to grant exclusive patent rights.96 Consider-
ing that the patent clause "is both a grant of power and a limita-
tion" the Court at first described the constitutional restraint in gen-
eral terms:
The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not over-
reach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional pur-
pose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly without regard to
the innovation, advancement or social benefit gained thereby.
Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents
whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public
domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.
Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of
useful knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system
which by constitutional command must "promote the Progress
of .. .useful Arts." This is the standard expressed in the
Constitution and it may not be ignored."
This explanation indicates that one constitutional limitation is
the requirement of novelty, since inventions already in the public
94. See, e.g., Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195 (1857) (Congress pre-
sumed to enact patent and copyright legislation under the intellectual property clause unless it
indicates otherwise); Graham, 383 U.S. at 5.
95. 383 U.S. at 17.
96. Id. at 5-6. In Graham, consideration of the constitutional issue was expressly lim-
ited to the patent portion of the intellectual property clause, i.e., that portion of article I,
section 8, clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution which authorizes the Congress "to promote the
progress of . . .useful arts, by securing for limited times to . . .inventors the exclusive right
to their ...discoveries...." Id. at 5 n.1 [hereinafter "patent clause"]. The Court indicated
that the patent clause appears in the Constitution "spliced together with the copyright provi-
sion, which we omit as not relevant here." Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1952)); R. DEWOLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW 15 (1925). Thus the Court
adopted the view that the intellectual property clause is a "balanced sentence" in which the
patent power is intended to promote the progress of useful arts, and the copyright power is
intended to promote the progress of science, as the authorities cited by the Court maintain. See
generally Lutz, Patents and Science - A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the United
States Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50 (1949); P. J. FEDERICO, COMMENTARY ON
THE NEW PATENT ACT, 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 3 (1954); Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 393, 394-97 (1960); cf. Fenning, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright
Clause of the Constitution, 11 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 438, 441-42 (1929) (drafts of intellectual
property clause phrased in two sentences) [hereinafter Fenning].
97. Graham, 383 U.S. at 5.
98. Id. at 6.
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domain may not be the subject of patents. Although the Court speci-
fies no quantum of innovation, advancement or social benefit, evi-
dently at least one of these factors must be present to some degree
before the exclusive rights secured by a patent may be "enlarged." 99
The constitutional limit is further defined in terms of constitutional
purpose. Patent legislation must promote the progress of the useful
arts, by adding to the sum of useful knowledge, innovation or ad-
vancement.1"' The constitutional limits that this passage describes
appear to be less stringent than the statutory limits currently in ef-
fect, since they relate to basic novelty, "advancement," which is not
in itself sufficient for patentability under the patent statute,1"' and to
such nonspecific requirements as "adding to the sum of useful
knowledge" or "social benefit."' 2 The foregoing description of the
99. The term is obscure. Cf Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210
U.S. 405, 423-24 (1908) (suggesting that the Constitution requires an absolute monopoly in
the patent grant).
100. Assuming that the statement of constitutional purpose is not intended radically to
alter the settled judicial interpretation of statutory patent law, the Court's reference to "ad-
vancement" must be regarded as generally synonymous with "progress of... useful arts" and
not as imposing an independent constitutional requirement of an advance in the art for patent-
ability. Since Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568), it has been
well settled that there is no requirement that an invention be an advance in the sense of being
an improvement over the prior art. See Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, App. at 24
(1818). The loose suggestion in Graham that the Constitution imposes such an "advance"
standard in addition to the statutory requirements has been rejected by the lower courts. See
Commissioner of Patents v. Deutsche Gold-und Silberscheideanstalt, 397 F.2d 656, 666-67
(D.C. Cir. 1968). The suggestion has also been criticized by commentators. See Note, The
1966 Patent Cases: Creation of a Constitutional Standard, 54 GEo. L.J. 1320, 1336-37
(1966). Compare earlier expressions of this view in In re Ratti, 270 F.2d 810, 814-15,
(C.C.P.A. 1959); In re Dean, 291 F.2d 947, 950 (C.C.P.A. 1961) and Rich, Principles of
Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 394-402 (1960). The "advance" standard has
been advocated by Lorenzo, Advance in the Art: The Essential Criterion of Patentability, 56
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 195 (1974); Bailey, A Proposal for: A Standard of Patentability; Conso-
nant Statutory Changes; A Manual on Determination of Patentability, 41 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 192 (1959).
101. Indeed, all five of the inventions at issue in Graham, Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chemi-
cal Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966), Anderson's-Black
Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969), and Great Adl. and Pac. Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equip. Co., 340 U.S. 147 (1950), were acknowledged by the lower courts to be
"advances" in the sense of improvements over the prior art, although this in itself was held
insufficient for patentability by the Supreme Court in four of the five instances. See Kimball,
An Analysis of Recent Supreme Court Assertions Regarding a Constitutional Standard of
Invention, 1 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J. 204, 224-27 (1973). Under the "patentable invention" stan-
dard judicially imposed under earlier patent statutes, it was often held that more than general
advancement or improvement was required to meet the requirement of "invention." See, e.g.,
Altoona Publix Theatres v. American Tri-Ergon Corp., 294 U.S. 477, 486 (1935); Slawson v.
Grand St. R.R., 107 U.S. 649, 653 (1883); Pearce v. Mulford, 102 U.S. 112, 118 (1880).
102. Like advancement, neither of these factors implies a minimum difference beyond
novelty. Judge Rich has suggested that progress in the useful arts is actually made
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constitutional standard, taken alone, is remarkably amorphous. It
provides little indication of practical prohibitions or limits that re-
strict Congress in enacting intellectual property legislation.' The
boundaries that the general constitutional limitation imposes are
made even less clear by the Court's acknowledgement that Congress
may select the policy that, in its judgment, best effects the constitu-
tional aim, as with any other article I power.'04 Furthermore, the
scope of congressional discretion includes the determination of condi-
tions and tests for patentability.'0 5
One specific constitutional limitation that the Court envisions
appears to be a minimum objective difference between an invention
to be patented and the prior art, since the Court explains specifically
in the context of the obviousness standard that "patent validity 're-
quires reference to a standard written into the Constitution.' " 06
This somewhat oblique reference to a constitutional requirement of a
minimum difference between an invention and the prior art is rein-
forced by the Court's conclusion that the nonobviousness standard of
section 103 "comports with the constitutional strictures. "'0" Further
indicating that it considers the Constitution to require such a thresh-
old minimum difference, the Court supports Thomas Jefferson's
views on the "general nature of the limited patent monopoly under
the Constitution"'0 8 and his asserted "insistence upon a high level of
patentability"'0 9 as one of the first administrators of the United
by the constant increment of improvements on what we already have, produced
both by the expected skill of ordinary workers in the arts and by the unobvious
developments which would not occur spontaneously from the application of such
ordinary skill. . . . Progress in useful arts is made as well by what may be
called enrichment as it is by improvement, by the duplication of means for doing
any given job.
Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 393, 399 (1960). Irrespective of
obviousness, advances such as the radically improved bituminous pavement machine in Ander-
son's-Black Rock, 396 U.S. at 57, add to the sum of useful knowledge, and provide a social
benefit.
103. See generally Kimball, An Analysis of Recent Supreme Court Assertions Regard-
ing a Constitutional Standard of Invention, 1 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J. 204, 226-27 (1973).
104. Graham, 383 U.S. at 6 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
105. Id. (citing McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843)).
106. Id. (quoting the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in Great At. and Pac. Tea
Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Co., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950)).
107. Id. at 17.
108. Id. at 7. The Court does not cite specific writings of Jefferson or any of his con-
temporaries which suggest that the patent clause of the United States Constitution was in-
tended to impose an affirmative requirement akin to nonobviousness as a condition for patent
validity. See infra notes 271-79 and accompanying text.
109. The Court states that "Jefferson did not believe in granting patents for small de-
tails, obvious improvements, or frivolous devices. His writings evidence his insistence upon a
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States patent system.'
Despite its somewhat indirect discussion of the practical conse-
quences of the constitutional limitation found in the patent clause,
the Court in Graham most clearly indicates its intent to establish a
constitutional requirement of a minimum difference from the prior
art beyond mere novelty by espousing the constitutional theory ex-
pressed in the concurring opinion of Justices Douglas and Black in
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment
Co."' The majority opinion in that case makes no reference to the
Constitution in holding invalid a patent for an apparently simple
mechanical combination"' for want of "patentable invention.""'
However, in a vitriolic attack on assertedly "incredible patents which
the Patent Office has spawned,"" 4 the concurring opinion maintains
that
every patent case involving validity presents a question which
requires reference to a standard written into the Constitution.
Article 1, Section 8 contains a grant to Congress of the power to
permit patents to be issued. But unlike most of the specific pow-
ers which Congress is given that grant is qualified. The Con-
gress does not have free reign, for example, to decide that pat-
ents should be easily or freely given. The Congress acts under
high level of patentability." Graham, 383 U.S. at 9, evidently adopting the view expressed in
Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 237, 241 (1936).
110. Jefferson is thought to have personally reviewed each of the sixty-seven patents
issued prior to December 31, 1793, when his three-and-one-half year term as Secretary of
State ended. Fouts, Jefferson the Inventor, and his Relation to the Patent System, 4 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'v 316, 331 (1922).
111. 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950).
112. The Court construed the claims as relating to a supermarket cashier's counter
equipped with a three-sided frame, or rack, with no top or bottom, which, when pushed or
pulled, would move deposited groceries to the checking clerk and leave them there when the
operation was repeated. The device was kept on the counter by guides. Id. at 149.
113. The opinion has been criticized not only for its suggestion that a different and
more exacting standard of invention applies to a combination entirely of old elements, but also
for the Delphic requirement imposed in such cases that "only when the whole in some way
exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable." Id. at 152. See, e.g.,
Rich, Laying the Ghost of the 'Invention' Requirement, 1 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J. 26, 32-33
(1972); Note, After Black Rock: New Tests of Patentability-The Old Tests of Invention, 39
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 123, 132-35 (1970). Neither standard has withstood the test of subse-
quent judicial scrutiny, particularly in the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., Connell v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548-49 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (rejecting the argument that combination
patents are subject to a more exacting standard); Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144,
1150 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (no requirement of synergism or new, unusual or surprising results for
patentability). See generally Harris, Prospects for Supreme Court Review of the Federal Cir-
cuit Standards for Obviousness of Inventions Combining Old Elements, 68 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'v 66 (1986).
114. Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 158.
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the restraint imposed by the statement of purpose in Art. 1, §
8.110
According to this view, the intellectual property clause itself im-
poses a minimum requirement for "invention," beyond novelty and
utility, and independent of any patent statute. The constitutional
standard is asserted to require that in order to be patentable, an in-
vention must "push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the
like" and "make a distinctive contribution to scientific
knowledge.""" 6
By favorably citing the Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co. concurring
opinion, and by repeating its suggestion that the Framers had a gen-
eral antipathy toward monopoly,' 17 Graham clearly suggests that the
Supreme Court considered a minimum difference between an inven-
tion and the prior art to be required not only by previous judicial
construction of statutory patent law, but also by the Constitution.
Although the Court clearly rejects any reading of the intellec-
tual property clause that would require an invention to advance the
frontiers of natural science, Graham does not delineate a minimum
threshold imposed by the Constitution. However, the Court's refer-
ence to the "general condition of patentability" formulated in Hotch-
kiss v. Greenwood"8 as the "cornerstone of the judicial evolution
suggested by Jefferson and left to the courts by Congress""' 9 suggests
that the Hotchkiss test for distinguishing between new and useful
innovations capable of sustaining a patent and those that are not, has
been elevated to constitutional status. 2 In Hotchkiss the Supreme
115. Id. at 154.
116. Id. Evidently this view is based on a reading of the intellectual property clause
which conceives the purpose of the patent power as "to promote the progress of science." Apart
from the dubious merits of including the promotion of "science" in the patent portion of a
"balanced" intellectual property clause, the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas has the
distinction of fashioning an entirely unprecedented standard of patentability based on the evi-
dent misunderstanding of the term "science" as referring to modern natural sciences, to the
exclusion of the "useful arts." See supra note 96. The outrage of the patent bar at this mis-
statement was typified by the comment that "[tihis was about as clearly wrong as a judicial
opinion on an intricate matter can possibly be. It was based on a complete disregard for the
constitutional promotion of the useful arts." Prager, Standards of Patentable Invention from
1474 to 1952, 20 U. GHi. L. REV. 69, 86 (1952).
117. The concurring opinion in Great Atd. and Pac. Tea Co. asserts that "Ielvery pat-
ent is the grant of a privilege of exacting tolls from the public. The Framers plainly did not
want those monopolies freely granted." 340 U.S. at 154. This opinion is echoed by the Court
in Graham, 383 U.S. at 7.
118. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
119. Graham, 383 U.S. at 11.
120. This assumption is widely shared by the commentators, both among supporters of
the standard, see, e.g., Rosenblatt, The Constitutional Standard for 'Ordinary Skill in the
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Court for the first time articulated that in order for an invention to
be patentable, it must require more ingenuity and skill than that
possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business.121
The distinction Hotchkiss established between the work of a skilled
mechanic and that of an inventor was the dominating factor used to
determine patentability until the 1952 revision of the patent statute.
Although the current statute phrases the pertinent inquiry in terms
of "obviousness" rather than "invention," the basic approach of
Hotchkiss has been adopted in section 103,12 which similarly re-
quires a comparison between the subject matter of a patent and the
prior art, with the objective difference being gauged by reference to
one of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.
In opinions since Graham, the Supreme Court has repeated its
assertion of a constitutional limitation grounded in the intellectual
property clause, without materially clarifying the standard applied.
In Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 2' the
Court indicated that "the patent standard is basically constitutional,"
repeating the general language regarding a constitutional standard
from Graham.24 Satisfied with this reiteration, the Court proceeded
to dispose of the case on the basis of the Great Atl. and Pac. Tea
Co. test, disregarding the factual inquiries described in Graham as
essential. 25
Art', 54 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 435 (1972); Irons & Sears, The Constitutional Standard of
Invention-The Touchstone for Patent Reform, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 653 (1973), and its
critics. See, e.g., Seidel, The Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 5 (1966); Kimball, An Analysis of Recent Supreme Court Assertions Regarding a Con-
stitutional Standard of Invention, 1 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J. 204 (1973); Note, The 1966 Patent
Cases: Creation of a Constitutional Standard, 54 GEO. L.J. 1320 (1966).
121. The patent at issue in Hotchkiss related to the mere substitution of clay or porce-
lain for wood or metal as materials for making doorknobs and was held invalid because of "an
absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every inven-
tion." 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 267.
122. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 14-17.
123. 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
124. Id. at 61.
125. In reverting to the Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co. test of whether a combination of
known elements results "in an effect greater than the sum of the several effects taken sepa-
rately," the Court found no "synergistic" result to be present. Further, the Court dismissed
evidence of initial disbelief of experts, long-felt need, unsuccessful experimentation and com-
mercial success, curtly stating that "those matters 'without invention will not make patentabil-
ity.' " Id. at 61 (quoting Great Atd. and Pac. Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 153). The reappearance of
the "invention" specter, considered buried in Graham, was widely lamented. See Comment,
The Statutory Standard of Patentability: The Necessity for a Relative Standard Dependent
Upon Factual Inquiries, 12 B. C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 917 (1971); Note, After Black Rock:
New Tests of Patentability-The Old Tests of Invention, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 123 (1970).
In Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976), the Court stated that "[ilt has long been
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C. The Constitutionality of the Chip Act Under the Graham
Standard
If, as suggested, the constitutional standard applied in Graham
is the same minimum statutory standard of nonobviousness or "pat-
entable invention" formerly applied under statutory patent law, then
the constitutional standard for granting exclusive rights in a useful
manufacture must require a considerably greater difference from the
prior art than mere "originality." While the Supreme Court did not
hold the nonobviousness standard itself to be the minimum required
by the Constitution, it appears that the Court would have regarded
any standard of difference that was considerably less rigorous than
nonobviousness as violating the constitutional minimum standard.
Both the monitory language with respect to the constitutional limita-
tion and the characterization of the copyright clause as "not rele-
vant" to the constitutional inquiry under patent law12 support this
conclusion.
Thus, Graham suggests that Congress must impose a minimum
requirement of difference from the prior art at least approximately
equivalent to nonobviousness in any statute extending exclusive
rights to useful discoveries, if such legislation is to withstand consti-
tutional scrutiny. Because the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act
expressly eliminates any comparable minimum difference require-
ment,127 it appears that the copyright standard of originality adopted
in the Act violates the threshold constitutional requirement estab-
lished by Graham, unless the Act can be sustained as an exercise of
the copyright or commerce powers.1 28
III. THE ALTERNATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL GRANTS OF POWER
RELIED UPON BY CONGRESS
In accordance with the long evolution of the Chip Act, from a
simple amendment of the copyright statute to sui generis protection
adapting copyright principles, congressional consideration of the con-
stitutional issue was largely concerned with precedent under copy-
right law. The basic constitutional question weighed by Congress
clear that the Constitution requires that there be some 'invention' to be entitled to patent
protection," but disposed of the case by "scrutinizing" the combination. patent at issue under
the Great Atd. and Pac. Tea Co. standard. Id. at 281-83.
126. See supra note 96.
127. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
128. It appears that a separate novelty requirement is established by 17 U.S.C. §
902(a)(2) (Supp. 11 1984), and that at least this "constitutional" standard is satisfied by the
Chip Act. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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was whether mask works and designs embodied in chips could be
considered "writings" within the meaning of the copyright clause.129
Doubt on this point was raised by opponents of the originally pro-
posed amendment to the Copyright Act's definition of copyrightable
subject matter, which included masks and chips. This was widely
regarded as a "dramatic departure" from the settled precepts of
copyright law,' 80 particularly the historical denial of copyright to
"utilitarian" articles.181
Although instructive, copyright principles developed under stat-
utory law are not necessarily dispositive of the affirmative scope of
power conferred by the copyright clause1 2 or the present constitu-
tional issue.'88 In limiting the scope of statutory copyright protection
to nonutilitarian works of authors, and narrowing the scope of regis-
trable subject matter by specific statutory definitions, Congress acted
with the express intent not to exhaust its constitutional powers in the
1976 Copyright Act."" In distinction to the copyright statute, the
129. See, e.g., Senate Report, supra note 9, at 12-13, 14-15; 1983 Senate Hearing,
supra note 9, at 17, 21, 88, 97, 101,105, 107; House Report, supra note 9, at 16 n.36; 1983
House Hearings, supra note 9, at 6-7, 11, 60, 81,108-109, 124, 171, 298; Senate Explanatory
Memorandum, supra note 24, at S12918; House Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 24,
at E4433.
130. See 1983 Senate Hearing, supra note 9, at 19-28, 46, 49 (statement of D. Schra-
der, Associate Register of Copyrights for Legal Affairs); 1983 Senate Hearing, supra note 9,
at 103 (statement of J. Baumgarten, Copyright Counsel to Association of American Publish-
ers). See generally 1983 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 76-81, 107-20 (statement of D.
Schrader); 1983 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 51-56, 60 (statement of L. Patterson, Pro-
fessor of Law, Emory University); 1983 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 234, 235 (letter
from R. Denicola, Professor of Law, University of Nebraska); 1983 House Hearings, supra
note 9, at 295 (letter from A. Latman, Professor of Law, New York University); 1983 House
Hearings, supra note 9, at 297, 298-99 (letter from J. Kidwell, Professor of Law, University
of Wisconsin); Kastenmeier, supra note 17, at 118-19.
131. 1983 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 88-89 (statement of D. Schrader, Associate
Register of Copyrights for Legal Affairs). The Copyright Act defines a "useful article" as "an
article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of
the article or to convey information." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
132. The copyright power is discussed in Writings, supra note 55; 1 M. NIMMER,
supra note 51, 1.01-1.11; Note, Constitutional Limits on Copyright Protection, 68 HARV. L.
REV. 517 (1955) [hereinafter Note, Constitutional Limits]; Richards, The Value of the Copy-
right Clause in Construction of Copyright Law, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 221 (1975); Note,
Constitutional Limitations Upon the Congressional Power to Enact Copyright Legislation,
1972 UTAH L. REV. 534 (1972).
133. Professor Nimmer, for instance, concludes that neither the absence of an exclusive
right in copyright law nor the limitation of copyright protection to expressions is constitution-
ally required, and that Congress could grant exclusive use rights to ideas and titles under the
copyright power. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 51, at 1.08[D].
134. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976). Accord Goldstein v.
California, 412 U.S. 546, 567-68 (1973) (power not fully exercised under former provision
providing copyright for "all the writings of an author").
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copyright clause makes no express reference to utilitarian or nonu-
tilitarian works. It requires only that a protected work be a "writ-
ing" and that it be the work of an "author." Although rarely inter-
preted by the courts, these terms
have not been construed in their narrow literal sense but,
rather, with the reach necessary to reflect the broad scope of
constitutional principles. While an "author" may be viewed as
an individual who writes an original composition, the term, in
its constitutional sense, has been construed to mean an "origina-
tor," "he to whom anything owes its origin." Similarly, al-
though the word "writings" might be limited to script or
printed material, it may be interpreted to include any physical
rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic
labor."'
In accordance with this policy-oriented construction, the consti-
tutional requirement of authorship has generally been regarded as
principally requiring that copyrighted works be original, " ' i.e.,
those which are not copied from others, but which originate with the
author. 3 7 The constitutional requirement does not appear to differ
significantly from the statutory requirement of originality,'" which
has been applied in practice to impose only a minimal requirement
135. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561 (quoting Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,
111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884)). In Mazer, the Court assumed without deciding that the constitutional
term "authors" includes the creator of a picture or a statue. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 208
(1954).
136. See Burrow-Giles, 111 U.S. at 58, 60-61; Sherry Mfg. Co. v. Towel King of Flor-
ida, Inc., 753 F.2d 1565, 1568 (11th Cir. 1985); Miller v. Universal City Studios, 650 F.2d
1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981); Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895,. 897 (5th Cir.
1972); Puddu v. Buonamici Statuary, Inc., 450 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1971); Alfred Bell &
Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951); Writings, supra note 55,
at 86. Professor Nimmer cautions that
It is important to distinguish between the requirement of originality and the
requirement of intellectual labor ... The doctrine of originality stems from
the Copyright Clause's use of the term "authors" and refers to independent
creation. Intellectual labor, on the other hand, suggests an absolute standard,
albeit a highly minimal one, of creativity.
I M. NIMMER, supra note 51, 1.08[C][1], at 1-48.
137. See supra note 51.
138. The difference, if any, between the minimal constitutional requirement of original-
ity and that imposed under statutory copyright law is insignificant, as indicated by cases con-
struing the~statutory requirement by the constitutional language. See, e.g., Sherry Mfg. Co.,
753 F.2d at 1568; Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980); Kamar
Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 1977); Sid & Marty Krofft
Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 n.5 (9th Cir. 1977); L. Batlin & Son,
Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976);
Alfred Bell & Co., 191 F.2d at 102-03; Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512 (2d
Cir. 1945).
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for copyright validity.189
The constitutional requirement of authorship was acknowl-
edged but received little congressional scrutiny in the chip protection
discussion. 4 Instead, congressional debate on the constitutionality of
the Chip Act was almost entirely concerned with the question of
whether mask works and semiconductor chip products could be con-
sidered constitutional "writings." 41 The necessity of a writing"4 2 has
also been construed to impose a minimal standard, 4" requiring only
physical fixation and a modicum of creativity. 44 In practice the con-
stitutional term has proved capable of vast extension beyond its lit-
eral or eighteenth-century meaning, from the first United States act
establishing copyright protection for any "map, chart, book or
books" 4" to engravings, etchings and prints," musical compositions
and cuts, 147 public performance of dramatic compositions, 48 photo-
graphs and negatives,1 ' paintings, drawings, chromos, statuettes,
statuary, and models or designs intended as works of fine art,'"0
compilations, periodicals, and works of art, 1  motion pic-
139. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
140. The sole reference to "authors" contained in H.R. 5525, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984), was deleted without comment in the Senate-House compromise amendment. See supra
note 49.
141. See supra note 129.
142. The statutory and constitutional history of the term is discussed extensively in
Writings, supra note 55.
143. See Writings, supra note 55, at 94-95; Note, Copyright Protection for Mass-Pro-
duced, Commercial Products: A Review of the Developments Following Mazer v. Stein, 38 U.
CI. L. REV. 807, 811-13 (1971); Dworkin, Originality in the Law of Copyright, 11 ASCAP
COPYRIGHT SYMP. 60, 70-71 (1962); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 51, 1.08[C] at 1-47.
144. The constitutional prerequisite of a "writing" requires that a modicum of creativity
be present in a work to support copyright. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879);
Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428, 431 (1891); Bailie v. Fischer, 258 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir.
1958); Gardenia Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 776, 781 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). However, the quantum of creativity or intellectual labor required. is very modest. See
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographying Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903); Universal Athletic Sales Co.
v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 908 (3d Cir. 1975); Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg.
Co., 421 F.2d 279, 281, 282 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970); Gelles-Widmer Co.
v. Milton Bradley Co., 313 F.2d 143, 146-47 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963);
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951).
145. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. As has often been pointed out, the first
copyright act arguably extended protection beyond the contemporary literal meaning of the
term "writings" by including charts and maps.
146. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171.
147. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
148. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138.
149. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540.
150. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212.
151. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 5, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (eliminating the previous
"work of fine art" requirement).
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tures,"' sound recordings, "  and computer programs. 5  Since the
decision in Mazer v. Stein, 155 holding that commercial use does not
invalidate copyright registration, copyright has been sustained in
such manufactures as eyeglass displays,1"  costume jewelry,' "  belt
buckles, " ornamental pencil sharpeners, " ' toy dolls, 60 fabric de-
signs,"' polyethylene lilacs,162 china designs, "  Santa Clauses,""
and "garish trinkets." '
Surprisingly, in view of the progressive extension of copyright
to ever-new classes of "writings," there is little Supreme Court pre-
cedent with respect to the potential limits of constitutional definition.
Only once, in the Trade-Mark Cases,6' has the Court held pro-
tected subject matter to exceed congressional power under the copy-
right clause, 167 and since the broad definition of "writings" provided
152. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488.
153. Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (codified
at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1, 5, 19-20, 26, 101(e) (1982)).
154. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1982)).
155. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
156. Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 95 (D. Del 1982).
157. See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Grossbardt, 428 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1970);
Boucher v. Du Boyes, Inc., 253 F.2d 948, 949 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 936 (1958).
158. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
159. Ted Arnold, Ltd. v. Silvereraft Co., 259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
160. See Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 824 n.2
(11th Cir. 1982); Kamar Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir.
1981); Uneeda Doll Co. v. Goldfarb Novelty Co., 373 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 389
U.S. 801 (1967); Rushton v. Vitale, 218 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1955).
161. See Novelty Textile Mills v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1977);
Millworth Converting Corp. v. Slifka, 276 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1960); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v.
Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960).
162. Prestige Floral, S.A. v. California Artificial Flower Co., 201 F. Supp. 287, 290-91
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
163. Syracuse China Corp. v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
164. Doran v. Sunset House Distrib. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940 (S.D. Cal. 1961), affid,
304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962).
165. Dan Kasoff, Inc. v. Novelty Jewelry Co., 309 F.2d 745, 746 (2d Cir. 1962). See
generally Note, Copyright Protection for Mass-Produced, Commercial Products: A Review of
the Developments Following Mazer v. Stein, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 807 (1971); Latman, Fifteen
Years After Mazer v. Stein: A Brief Perspective, 16 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc. 278 (1968-69);
Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law: From the Berne Revi-
sion of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1227-38; Reichman, De-
sign Protection: A Comparative View, 31 J. COPYRIGHT Soc. 267, 312-24, 352-58 (1983-84).
166. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
167. The Trade-Mark Cases held that trademarks could not be protected as writings of
authors because they were not "the fruits of intellectual labor." Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S.
82, 94 (1878). During the same term, the Court indicated that written materials used for the
encouragement of "mere industry" or "mere advertisement" did not rise to the constitutional
dignity of "science" required for copyright protection. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105-06
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in Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony,'68 it has been settled
law that the constitutional term is not limited to typography and
chirography,"' but also includes "any physical rendering of the
fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.' 7 0
The extremely modest threshold requirement of a "writing"
should easily be satisfied both by mask works and chips, which are
undoubtedly the "fruits of intellectual labor," determined by Con-
gress to require intensive human effort and significant creative abil-
ity.1 7' No limit inherent in the constitutional definition requires the
exclusion of mask works or chips from copyright protection, unless
an affirmative proscription elsewhere in the Constitution applies to
restrict the exercise of the copyright power.
Despite the broad construction of the term "writings," copyright
protection has never been afforded to utilitarian articles that do not
have separable artistic features.' 72  Since Baker v. Selden,'7 3  the
courts have maintained a basic, if imprecise, 74 distinction between
(1880) (citing Clayton v. Stone, 5 F. Cas. 999 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2,872)). This mis-
chievous suggestion was followed in Higgins v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428 (1891), holding that
writings intended for such noncreative purposes as labels or advertising were not protectable
subject matter under the Copyright Act. Id. at 431. For a time it appeared as though a subjec-
tive criterion of artistic merit would be implied by the judiciary as a limitation on the copy-
right power. See, e.g., National Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294, 297-98
(7th Cir. 1902); J.L. Mott Iron Works v. Clow, 82 F. 316 (7th Cir. 1897). However, the
distinction between "artistic" or "scientific" endeavor and advertising was later abandoned in
Bleistein, where any requirement of artistic merit or judicial competence to determine this
elusive quality was repudiated. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithography Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52
(1903). See Jeweler's Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 F. 83, 87 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922).
168. 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
169. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 210 n.15 (1954).
170. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). See generally Writings, supra
note 55, at 83.
171. See House Report, supra note 9, at 2, 12; Senate Report, supra note 9, at 8; see
generally Kastenmeier, supra note 17, at 125. It is virtually certain that the level of creativity
typically manifested in mask works is sufficient to satisfy any residual standard remaining
after Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251.
172. See House Report, supra note 9, at 8 ("fundamental principle" of copyright law);
Senate Report, supra note 9, at 6-7, 12; 1983 Senate Hearing, supra note 9, at 21; 1983
House Hearings, supra note 9, at 109 (statements of D. Schrader, Associate Register of Copy-
rights for Legal Affairs); House Hearings, supra note 9, at 235 (letter from R. Denicola,
Professor of Law, University of Nebraska); I M. NiMMER, supra note 51, at 2.08[D], 2.18.
173. 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
174. The Copyright Office had registered schematic diagrams, "mylar sheets," photo-
lithographic masks and similar representations used in the manufacture of chips, despite ques-
tions of whether the masks, as opposed to paper or mylar layouts, convey information or are
simply part of the manufacturing process. 1979 Hearing, supra note 9, at 6 (statement of J.
Baumgarten, General Counsel, United States Copyright Office). See also 1983 House Hear-
ings, supra note 9, at 87-88 (statement of D. Schrader, Associate Register of Copyrights for
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patentable and copyrightable subject matter, largely based on criteria
such as the utilitarian or non-utilitarian nature of the work,' its
ability to convey information, 17  and the distinction between "expres-
sions" and "ideas." 1 7 In introducing this dichotomy in Baker, the
Court held that a copyright in a book describing an accounting sys-
tem was limited to the explanation or expression describing the sys-
tem and did not grant an exclusive right to its use.'17 The basis for
the Court's holding was that granting copyright protection to an art
or manufacture "when no examination of its novelty has ever been
officially made, would be a surprise and a fraud upon the public.
That is the province of letters-patent, not of copyright.)' 1 9
In referring broadly to general principles applicable not only to
the bookkeeping system at issue, but also to such useful manufac-
tures as medicines, ploughs, watches, churns, paints and dyes,, 80
Baker suggested that the denial of copyright to any useful discovery
might not only be a matter of statutory construction, but instead be
Legal Affairs).
175. Codified in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). See cases cited infra note 182 and accompany-
ing text.
176. Utilitarian articles are copyrightable if they "convey information." 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1982). See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1250-52 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) (computer object code); United States v.
Hamilton, 583 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1978) (maps); Schroeder v. William Morrow & Co., 566
F.2d 3 (7th Cir. 1977) (directory of nurseries); Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d
895 (5th Cir. 1972) (architectural plans); Jeweler's Circular Pub. Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co.,
281 F. 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922) (directory of trademarks); Reiss v.
National Quotation Bureau, 276 F. 717, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (compilation of meaningless
code words).
177. Codified in 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (1982). In copyright law, this doctrine has imposed
two distinct limitations: first, a copyright protects the particular expression of an author but
does not grant any exclusive rights in the underlying idea. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99
(1880); Miller v. Universal City Studios, 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981); Universal
Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904, 908 (3d Cir. 1975); Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931); and second, if an
idea is essentially limited to but a few possible expressions, the expressions are not copyright-
able. See Apple Computer, Inc., 714 F.2d at 1252-53; Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v.
Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 741-42 (9th Cir. 1971); Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379
F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967).
The distinction between idea and expression has endured as a basic tenet of copyright
law. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 550,
571 (1973); Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 912 (2d Cir. 1980); Sid & Marty
Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977); Reyher v. Chil-
dren's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976);
Note, Copyright Protection for Mass-Produced, Commercial Products: A Review of the Devel-
opments Following Mazer v. Stein, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 807, 809 (1971).
178. Baker, 101 U.S. at 101-02, 104.
179. Id. at 102.
180. Id. at 102-03.
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required to prevent usurpation of a province reserved for patent
protection:
The description of the art in a book, though entitled to the ben-
efit of copyright, lays no foundation for an exclusive claim to the
art itself. The object of the one is explanation; the object of the
other is use. The former may be secured by copyright. The lat-
ter can only be secured, if it can be secured at all, by letters-
patent."8
In the century since Baker, the courts often have reflexively adhered
to the suggestion of a basic distinction between patentable and copy-
rightable subject matter,182 refusing to extend copyright protection to
useful articles, which are considered more properly the subject of
patent protection. 8'
The chief obstacle to providing exclusive rights to mask works
or chips under the copyright power is that masks are basic tools
used in a manufacturing process 84 and chips are the products
produced. Mask works and chips are solely utilitarian articles,
181. Id. at 105.
182. See Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985)
(mannequin); Poe v. Missing Persons, 745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1984) (arguably, a swimsuit);
Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1983) (advertising display folder);
Norris Indus. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir.) (hub cap), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Maddox, 379 F.2d 84, 85 (6th Cir. 1967)
(buildings); Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1972) (buildings);
Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (outdoor lighting fixture), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 908 (1979); Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 913, 914-15 (2d Cir.
1980) (mechanical features of toys); Modern Aids, Inc. v. R.H. Macy & Co., 264 F.2d 93 (2d
Cir. 1959) (per curiam) (massage machine); Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Bally Mfg. Corp.,
568 F. Supp. 1274, 1279-81 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (mechanical features of toys); Russell v. Trimfit,
Inc., 428 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (stockings), aff'd mem., 568 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1978);
SCOA Indus. v. Famolare, Inc., 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (shoe soles);
Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 155 F. Supp. 932
(S.D.N.Y. 1957) (watch face), aff d in part, rev'd on other grounds, 260 F.2d 637 (2d Cir.
1958); Fulmer v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 1021 (Ct. Cl. 1952) (parachute); Muller v.
Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (bridge approach); Jack Add-
man, Inc. v. Sonners & Gordon, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (dress design),
Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir.) (blank charts), cert. denied, 332
U.S. 801 (1947); Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir.
1943) (blank charts), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 785 (1944); but cf Harcourt, Brace & World,
Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (blank charts).
183. The distinction is criticized as illogical, although acknowledged as pervasive. See
Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works, 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc. 209, 228-32
(1982-83).
184. See supra notes 11, 41 and accompanying text.
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without separable artistic features,"'5 by any test ever applied,1" de-
spite their complexity and the "artistry" required for their design.18
Although Baker and its progeny have developed the law in a
statutory rather than a constitutional context, they suggest a serious
and unresolved question of whether a comparable constitutional lim-
itation on the copyright power is necessary to preserve independent
meaning in the patent clause. Such a structural limitation on the
copyright power could be implied in several ways: (1) from the bal-
anced sentence construction of the intellectual property clause,188 (2)
from the necessity of preventing the extinction of the patent clause 89
by erasing subject matter distinctions followed since the first patent
and copyright acts, 90 (3) from the "basically different" constitu-
tional standards assumed to exist for patent and copyright protec-
tion, 91 or (4) from an assessment of the different economic conse-
quences of traditional patent and copyright protection."' The
185. In Mazer, the Court held that statuettes copyrightable as works of art did not lose
their registrability when they were used in articles of manufacture as ornamental bases for
electric table lamps. In holding that such commercial utility was not a bar to copyright protec-
tion, the Court observed that the verbal distinction between purely aesthetic articles and useful
works of art ended with the 1909 Copyright Act. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 211 (1954).
However, since Mazer it has been held that the artistic features must be physically separable,
see Norris Indus., 696 F.2d at 924; Esquire, Inc., 591 F.2d at 800-04; Eltra Corp. v. Ringer,
579 F.2d 294, 297 (4th Cir. 1978), or conceptually separable, see Kieselstein-Cord v. Accesso-
ries by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 994 (2d Cir. 1980), from functional elements to sustain
copyrightability.
186. See House Report, supra note 9, at 4, 6, 9, 10; Senate Report, supra note 9, at 6;
1983 Senate Hearing, supra note 9, at 21; 1983 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 92 (state-
ments of D. Schrader, Associate Register of Copyrights for Legal Affairs).
187. See supra note 18; 1983 Senate Hearing, supra note 9, at 87 (statement of A.
Miller, Professor of Law, Harvard University) ("artistry" of chip design deserves protection);
cf. 130 CONG. REC. H643 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1983) (statement of Rep. Edwards) ("layouts
and art works" pirated by "free riders").
188. See supra note 96; Note, Constitutional Limits, supra note 131, at 524-25.
189. See Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1972) ("pre-
emption" of patent law would occur if structure were protected by copyrighted architectural
drawing); cf. Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195, 197 (1857) (patent power held
domestic in character and necessarily confined within the limits of the United States, in order
to prevent interference with the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and the
treaty-making power).
190. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 100-01 (2d Cir.
1951); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56-57 (1884).
191. See L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976); Gelles-Widmer Co. v. Milton Bradley Co., 313 F.2d 143, 146
(7th Cir), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963); Wihtol v. Wells, 231 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir.
1956); Alfred Bell & Co., 191 F.2d at 101-02; cf. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5
n.1 (1966) (copyright clause "not relevant" to discussion of patent power).
192. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 421 (1984); Bobbs-Mer-
rill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1908); Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult
Theater, 604 F.2d 852, 860 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980); Imperial
Homes Corp., 458 F.2d at 899; Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738,
741-42 (9th Cir. 1971); Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910, 911 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 801 (1947); House Report, supra note 9, at 8-9; 1983 House Hearings,
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studied refusal of the courts to sustain copyrights in subject matter
traditionally assigned to patent protection,"' and the absence of sig-
nificant historical overlap between the subject matter of copyrights
and patents,"" are sufficient to raise doubt on the constitutionality of
legislation protecting either masks or chips under the copyright
power.' 95
In response to objections that statutory copyright was unsuited
for protection of useful articles 9 and that copyright protection of
mask works would distort traditional copyright concepts,' 97 Congress
adopted the sui generis model of the Chip Act.' 98 Although it pro-
tected the conceptual purity of copyright law from distorting influ-
ences, casting the Chip Act in a freestanding chapter of Title 17 did
not resolve all doubts as'to the compatibility of copyright-like protec-
tion and utilitarian manufactures such as chips.' 99 Uncertain that
supra note 9, at 235 (letter from R. Denicola, Professor of Law, University of Nebraska);
1983 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 299 (letter from J. Kidwell, Professor of Law, Univer-
sity of Wisconsin); 1983 Senate Hearing, supra note 9, at 90 (statement of A. Miller, Profes-
sor of Law, Harvard University). See generally Note, Protection for the Artistic Aspects of
Articles of Utility, 72 HAV. L. REV. 1520, 1526-27, 1530 (1959).
193. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
194. See Taylor Instrument Co. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 785 (1944). The court stated that:
While it may be difficult to determine in which field protection must be sought,
it is plain, so we think, that it must be in one or the other; it cannot be found in
both. In other words, there is no overlapping territory, even though the line of
separation may in some instances be difficult of exact ascertainment.
Id. at 99; see Kline, Requiring an Election of Protection for Patentable/ Copyrightable Com-
puter Programs, 67 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 280 (1985). But see Apple Computer, Inc. v. Frank-
lin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1251 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033
(1984).
195. Rep. Kastenmeier has urged that protection under the Chip Act extends only to
mask works and not to "the actual chip itself." Consequently, the Act "does not create a
shelter larger than the supporting walls of the Constitution. Any material that fails to qualify
as a 'writing' does not receive protection under the Act." Kastenmeier, supra note 17, at 151.
However, it is clear that the Act expressly grants exclusive rights to import or distribute chip
products. 17 U.S.C. § 905(2) (Supp. 11 1984). In addition, the exclusive right to "reproduce
the mask work in any fashion" includes reproducing a chip "embodying" the mask work. See
supra note 27; see generally House Report, supra note 9, at 16-17, 20. For this reason, it is
unclear in what sense, if any, the Chip Act fails to protect "the actual chip itself." Protection
of chips, as opposed to masks, was identified as a constitutional problem by Professor Kidwell.
1983 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 298-99 (Letter from J. Kidwell, Professor of Law,
University of Wisconsin).
196. See supra notes 11, 41 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 24, 130-31; see generally Kastenmeier, supra note 17, at 138-40.
198. See House Report, supra note 9, at 5-11. For a legislative history, see supra notes
24-25.
199. These objections were not overcome by the sui generis solution, which has been
described as "copyright protection masquerading as sui generis law" that fails to provide a
suitable legal framework for the protection of useful articles such as chips. Note, Semiconduc-
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mask works and semiconductor chip products as defined in the Act
would be considered "writings" within the meaning of the copyright
clause,2 00 the Senate invoked the commerce power by adding the lim-
itation that only "conduct in or affecting commerce" would constitute
actionable infringement.20'
A. The Scope of Legislative Power Under the Commerce Clause
To overcome any constitutional doubt as to the affirmative
copyright power, Congress called upon its power "to regulate com-
merce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with
the Indian tribes."' 02 The Senate Report explains that this limitation
was included with the intention of providing additional constitutional
support for the Chip Act, likening its reliance on two constitutional
powers to "using a belt and suspenders to protect [a copyrighted]
work." 203
Congress' prudence in invoking the power to regulate commerce
can scarcely be doubted in view of the extremely broad scope of com-
merce power legislation upheld by the Supreme Court.20' The com-
merce power has been considered sufficient to sustain not only laws
tor Chip Protection: Changing Roles for Copyright and Competition, 71 VA. L. REV. 249,
286, 292-95 (1985). Professor Kidwell theorized that in extending protection beyond mask
works themselves, Congress intended to make the rights in mask works "functionally as deep
as the rights available under the patent statute" while avoiding the novelty and nonobviousness
requirements, which he considered "bad policy." 1983 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 299
(letter from J. Kidwell, Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin). See also 1983 House
Hearings, supra note 9, at 171 (statement of D. Schrader, Associate Register of Copyrights for
Legal Affairs) (sui generis approach "finesses" constitutional problems).
200. The House addressed and affirmatively resolved the issue of whether chips could
be protected as "writings." House Report, supra note 9, at 16 n.36. The Senate further de-
fined a chip as a product "that is a writing, or the manufacture, use, or distribution of which is
in or affects commerce." S. 1201, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1983).
201. 17 U.S.C. § 910(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
202. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
203. Senate Report, supra note 9, at 15 (quoting 1983 Senate Hearing, supra note 9, at
91 (statement of A. Miller, Professor of Law, Harvard University)). The Senate Report indi-
cates that "primary reliance" is placed on the copyright clause, but that the commerce power is
also relied upon to obviate "any possible problems or speculations regarding legislative power,
such as those found in The Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1878)." Senate Report, supra note
9, at 14-15; see Senate Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 24, at S12918.
204. Outside the context of the tenth amendment and its restriction of the federal power
to regulate state governments, this topic has not been extensively treated by commentators. See
Note, Constitutional Limitation of Congressional Commerce Clause Power, 58 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 109 (1981); Bogen, The Hunting of the Shark: An Inquiry Into the Limits of Congres-
sional Power Under the Commerce Clause, 8 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 187 (1972); Light, The
Federal Commerce Power, 49 VA. L. REV. 717 (1963).
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regulating navigation,0 5 transportation of goods in commerce," 6 and
market or commercial transactions,"0 ' but also to provide a basis for
public health,208 social welfare, 0 9 labor210 and civil rights... mea-
sures. The power is so all-encompassing as to extend to such local
crimes as loan sharking,' to the local noncommercial production of
205. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). In Gibbons, the Court held
that the commerce clause provides the federal government with the authority to regulate navi-
gation on the waters of the United States, and dissolved an injunction issued by the New York
courts forbidding the operation in New York waters of steamboats licensed by the federal
government to carry on the coasting trade. Id. at 239-40.
206. See, e.g., Houston, E. & W. Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)
("Shreveport Rate Case") (federal regulation of intrastate rail rates pursuant to Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, § 3, 24 Stat. 379, 380); Southern Ry. v. United States, 222
U.S. 20 (1911) (railroad safety equipment in intrastate traffic required by Safety Appliance
Act of 1893, ch. 196, 27 Stat. 531, amended by Act of Mar. 2, 1903, ch. 976, 32 Stat. 943
(codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 8-10 (1982)); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. I.C.C., 221
U.S. 612 (1911) (maximum work hour regulations for railroad workers in interstate commerce
under Act of Mar. 4, 1907, ch. 2939, 34 Stat. 1415 (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 61-
64 (1982)).
207. See, e.g., United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942) (minimum
milk price requirements under Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, ch. 296, 50
Stat. 246 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. (1982)); Board of Trade v.
Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923) (regulation of grain exchanges under Grain Futures Act of 1922, ch.
369, 42 Stat. 998 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-17 (1982)); Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S.
495 (1922) (regulation of stockyard charges under Packers and Stockyards Act of 1921, ch. 64,
42 Stat. 159 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 181-229 (1982)); Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274
(1908) (application of Sherman Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982) to commercial boycott); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375
(1905) (application of Sherman Act to price-fixing in livestock markets); Northern Sec. Co. v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904)) (prohibition of stock pooling arrangement under Sherman
Act).
208. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (Filled Milk Act of
1923, ch. 262, 42 Stat. 1486 (current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 61-63 (1982))); Weeks v. United
States, 245 U.S. 618 (1918) (mislabeling provisions of Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906, ch.
3915, 34 Stat. 768); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (adulteration
provisions of Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906).
209. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (minimum wage and maximum
hour provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended 29
U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219 (Supp. 1986)).
210. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (National Labor
Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, as amended 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (Supp. 11
1984)).
211. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) (Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (Supp. 11 1984), as applied to state government officials by
Act of Apr. 8, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a)(2), 88 Stat. 55, 74 (codified as amended in
29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1982))); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (public accommo-
dations provisions of Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982) as applied
to restaurant); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (public accom-
modations provisions of Title II of Civil Rights Act of 1964, as applied to motel).
212. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (loan-sharking provisions of Title
II of Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1982)).
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grain for personal consumption,21 and to the regulation of private
morality, both in its commercial"14 and noncommercial aspects.21 5
As originally construed by Chief Justice John Marshall, in a
definition often since confirmed,21 the commerce power,
like all others vested in congress, is complete in itself, may be
exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations,
orher [sic] than are prescribed in the constitution. . . . If, as
has always been understood, the sovereignty of congress, though
limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the
power over commerce with foreign nations, and among the sev-
eral states, is vested in congress as absolutely as it would be in a
single government, having in its constitution the same restric-
tions on the exercise of the power as are found in the constitu-
tion of the United States.21
7
Furthermore, the wisdom of Congress in deciding what mea-
sures are necessary or appropriate to carry out the regulation of
commerce is not subject to significant judicial review. 218 At least in
the last half century, the Supreme Court has adhered to Chief Jus-
tice Marshall's view that the effective limitation on congressional ex-
213. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (wheat acreage allotment applicable
to production not intended in any part for commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm
sustained under Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, ch. 30, 52 Stat. 31, as amended by Act
of May 26, 1941, ch. 133, 55 Stat. 203 (current version at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1340 (1982))).
214. See Weber v. Freed, 239 U.S. 325 (1915) (prohibition of importation of films of
prize fights for public exhibition under Act of July 31, 1912, ch. 263, § 1, 37 Stat. 240); Hoke
v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (conviction for transportation of women for purposes of
prostitution under the White Slave Act of 1910, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825); Champion v. Ames,
188 U.S. 321 (1903) (prohibition of importation or transportation of lottery tickets under the
Lottery Act of 1895, ch.. 191, 28 Stat. 963).
215. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 483 (1917) (conviction under White
Slave Act of 1910, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 for single instance of interstate transportation of
woman "for the purpose of debauchery," despite absence of commercial motive or gain).
216. In Wickard, the Court approvingly cited Chief Justice Marshall's definition of the
commerce power "with a breadth never yet exceeded" and stated that in adopting "broader
interpretations of the Commerce Clause" the Court was bringing about "a return to the prin-
ciples first enunciated" in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Wickard, 317 U.S.
at 122.
217. Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196-97.
218. In Chief Justice Marshall's view,
[t]he wisdom and the discretion of congress, their identity with the people, and
the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in
many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints
on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse. They are the re-
straints on which the people must often rely solely, in all representative
governments.
1J
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ercise of the power is political, rather than judicial. 2 '9 In fact, the
Court restricts judicial review in commerce power cases to determin-
ing whether Congress had a rational basis for concluding that the
regulated subject matter could affect interstate commerce. 2 Since
1936, the Supreme Court has held only once, 22' and then fleet-
ingly,' that a federal statute exceeded the commerce power. With
the disappearance of the narrow sphere carved out to protect state
governments from federal economic regulation, 23 it remains true
that the power "is as broad as the economic needs of the nation."224
B. Affirmative Constitutional Limits on the Exercise of the
Enumerated Powers
Particularly in view of express congressional findings that the
219. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, reh'g denied, 471
U.S. 1049 (1985). In Wickard, the Court taught that conflicts of economic interest under fed-
eral regulatory legislation are "wisely left ...to . . .Congress under its more flexible and
responsible legislative process. Such conflicts rarely lend themselves to judicial determination.
And with the wisdom, workability, or fairness, of the plan of regulation we have nothing to
do." 317 U.S. at 129. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115, 120-21 (1941); United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 151 (1938); Northern Sec. Co. v. United States,
193 U.S. 197, 337-38, 350-52 (1904); Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 353 (1903); Veazie
Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 548 (1869).
220. In Carolene Prods. Co., the Court stated the rule which has prevailed since:
Even in the absence of such aids the existence of facts supporting the legislative
judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary com-
mercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light
of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowl-
edge and experience of the legislators.
Id. at 152 (footnote omitted). Justice Stone's opinion in Carolene Prods. Co. also outlined the
exception to the rule, indicating that closer scrutiny is required when legislation affects a pre-
ferred right such as those secured by the Bill of Rights, or a racial minority. Id. at 152 n.4.
221. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976), the Supreme
Court held that the extension of the minimum wage and maximum hour provisions of the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1974 as applied to state governments was unconstitutional under the
tenth amendment, since the provisions operated to directly displace the states' freedom to struc-
ture integral operations in areas of traditional government functions. National League over-
ruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
222. National League in turn was overruled in Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531.
223. After being dismissed as a limitation on the enumerated commerce power in Gib-
bons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 198 (1824) and Champion, 188 U.S. at 357, the tenth
amendment reappeared as a bar to federal regulation of local private economic activity in
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), eventually overruled in Darby, 312 U.S. at 100.
In Darby, the Court dismissed the tenth amendment as a "truism" ineffective to limit federal
authority from resorting to all means for the exercise of a granted power which are appropri-
ate and plainly adapted to the permitted end. 312 U.S. at 124. The dissenting justices in
Garcia vowed to restore the tenth amendment limitation. 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
224. American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104 (1946).
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semiconductor industry is threatened by copying,' it appears incon-
trovertible that the Chip Act is within the commerce power as a
regulation of predatory practices that "affect" both foreign and inter-
state commerce.220 However, a determination that either a regulated
article or practice affects commerce between the states is not suffi-
cient in itself to sustain the validity of a law passed pursuant to the
commerce power. Two inquiries are necessary: first, whether the
constitutional provision relied upon provides the power in the first
instance, 27 and second, whether an affirmative limitation within the
Constitution restricts a power otherwise granted. With respect to the
first consideration, the commerce power provides a more certain ba-
sis for chip protection legislation than the copyright clause, because
it does not contain the requirements of a "writing" and an "au-
thor."22 However, with regard to the second question, the Supreme
Court has recently reaffirmed that in the exercise of the commerce
power, Congress may not transgress any affirmative limitation im-
posed by other constitutional provisions.2 29
Although the restriction of article I, section 8 powers has not
been a fertile field of litigation in recent years, the Supreme Court
has limited the exercise of enumerated legislative powers by applying
various constitutional limitations, including Bill of Rights provisions
such as the fifth2 .. and sixth2 " amendments, 3 2 as well as a number
225. See supra notes 21-22.
226. Regulating production of a commodity is a legitimate exercise of the commerce
power if the commodity "[e]xerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce" even
though the activity may be local and may not even be regarded as commerce. See Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942).
227. The taxation power, for example, may be augmented by the currency power (U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5), as in Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869), or by the
arguably broader commerce power, see Minor v. United States, 396 U.S. 87, 98 n.13 (1969);
Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 595-96 (1884) ("Head Money Cases"), to sustain legislation
in a given instance.
228. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 51, at 1.09; Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150
F.2d 512, 513 n.2 (2d Cir. 1945).
229. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 236, 248 (1983); cf. South Dakota v. Dole,
107 S. Ct. 2793, 2796-97 (1987) (spending power). This principle has been recognized since
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824), although its application has varied
widely, particularly in the era from Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908) to
Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 347 (1935) when the Court was willing
to strike down commerce clause legislation on the basis that economic due process under the
fifth amendment was denied.
230. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
231. See United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
232. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 841 (1976); Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 44 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (1957). Although National League of Cities has
been overruled, the principle that affirmative limitations contained in the Constitution limit the
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of others.2" The establishment clause of the first amendment oper-
ates as a specific constitutional limitation on the exercise by Congress
of the taxing and spending power.2 " Improper delegation of article
I, section 8 legislative powers to the executive is prohibited " both
by the requirement that all legislative powers shall be vested in Con-
gress286 and by the necessary and proper clause. 8 Although con-
gressional regulatory power under the postal clause 38 permits the
Legislature to forbid use of the mails, and to regulate their con-
tent,2 0 such exercise of the postal power is subject to first amend-
ment guarantees of freedom of speech2 41 and the fourth amendment
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure. 2  The enumer-
ated power "to make rules for the government and regulation of the
land and naval forces '2 4  has been held limited by the due process
clause, 2".' and this basic constitutional guarantee of due process also
limits the exercise of the naturalization power,2 ' which has been
characterized as the broadest of the enumerated powers. 2 " The pro-
hibition against bills of attainder2 47 applies to prevent the spending
power " from being exercised to legislatively forbid payment of sala-
exercise of the commerce power was also recognized by the dissenting justices in National
League of Cities, who disputed the contention that any restraint based on state sovereignty was
found in the Constitution. 426 U.S. at 858.
233. For discussion of limits on the commerce power, see articles cited supra note 204.
234. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1968).
235. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); see also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U.S. 238 (1936) (Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935, ch. 824, 49 Stat. 991); Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (section 3 of National Industrial Recov-
ery Act of 1933); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (section 9 of National
Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 200).
236. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1.
237. Id. § 8, cl. 18.
238. Id. § 8, cl. 7.
239. See Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 442 (1938).
240. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
241. See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965); Milwaukee Social
Dem. Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Any restriction
on the free dissemination of information requires procedural safeguards to protect the exercise
of first amendment rights. See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 416 (1971).
242. See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732-33 (1878).
243. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
244. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
245. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
246. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344
U.S. 590, 596 (1953); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909);
Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1903).
247. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
248. Id. § 8, cl. I gives Congress the power "to lay and collect taxes ...to pay the
debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States." Article I,
section 9, clause 7 provides that "[njo money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in conse-
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ries to named federal employees.2 9 Courts established under the
bankruptcy power 250 must conform to the requirements of article
111.251
These individual instances of affirmative constitutional limita-
tions on article I, section 8 powers illustrate the general principle
that despite their "plenary" nature, the enumerated legislative pow-
ers may not be exercised in derogation of any limitation on the
power of the federal government contained in the Constitution." 2 As
Justice Frankfurter emphasized in Reid v. Covert:
The Constitution is an organic scheme of government to be
dealt with as an entirety. A particular provision cannot be dis-
severed from the rest of the Constitution. Our conclusion in
these cases therefore must take due account of Article III and
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.258
From the standpoint of such external, affirmative limitations,
the commerce power is no more "plenary" than the other "plenary"
powers conferred on the legislative branch by article I, including the
254patent power. If an affirmative constitutional limitation is imposed
by the patent clause, it cannot be avoided by merely citing another
enumerated power. It cannot seriously be contended that Congress
could overstep the express limitations of the patent clause by grant-
ing perpetual, exclusive rights in a discovery under its commerce
power,255 or by securing such rights for subject matter which is not
novel, 2 5 or to an importer rather than an inventor.2 57 For the same
reasons, any implied constitutional restriction against securing exclu-
quence of appropriations made by law." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
249. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
250. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
251. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982).
252. See generally United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941); United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
253. 354 U.S. 1, 44 (1957) (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black agreed that "[tihe
United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other
source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution." Id.
at 5-6 (opinion joined by Justices Warren, Douglas, and Brennan).
254. See McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843), quoted infra note 264;
.cf Solorio v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2924, 2928 (1987).
255. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
256. See supra note 98 and accompanying text; see also infra note 430.
257. The term "inventor" has long been construed as expressing a requirement of origi-
nality. Such a construction prevents the issuance of a patent to the first importer of a useful
article, or to one who derives an invention from another. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Sprague, 3 F.
Cas. 648, 650 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 1,518); Whitney v. Emmett, 29 F. Cas. 1074, 1082
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1,831) (No. 17,585).
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sive rights in a useful article under the patent power, resulting from
the failure to require a sufficient degree of nonobviousness, should
not be avoided by congressional invocation of the commerce power.
With respect to constitutional restrictions on government-established
"monopoly" rights, the congressional power under both the copy-
right clause and the commerce clause depends upon the same issue:
the existence of an implied constitutional threshold requirement of
nonobviousness.
IV. THE APPROPRIATENESS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
With respect to the history of the constitutional standard, apart
from its reference to the concurring opinion in Great Ati. and Pac.
Tea Co., 58 the Court in Graham cites no case precedent for the
conclusion that the statement of purpose contained in the intellectual
property clause "is both a grant of power and a limitation." '' This
constitutional doctrine had never been articulated clearly before the
Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co. decision. " 0 In the century between the
first formulation of the "patentable invention" standard in Hotch-
kiss,261 and the codification of the obviousness standard in section
103," the requirement of a minimum difference beyond mere nov-
elty was judicially developed in the context of statutory patent law
fashioned by Congress. 2 During that time, the Supreme Court gen-
erally indicated its intention to fulfill the legislative purpose without
258. 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
259. Graham, 383 U.S. at 5.
260. Prior to Great Atl. & Pac.Tea Co., the constitutional theory proposed in the con-
curring opinion had not been expounded clearly even by Justices Douglas and Black. See, e.g.,
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 279 (1944) (Black, J., dis-
senting); Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941) (Douglas, J.).
A conceptually distinct constitutional theory is presented by Justice Black's dissent in Exhibit
Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 137 (1942), based not upon the requirement
of promoting the progress of the useful arts, but rather on an essentially semantic argument
that the constitutional terms "inventors" and "discoveries" may be redefined according to indi-
vidual justices' views of the intrinsic worth of inventions. Id. at 138. See also Williams Mfg.
Co. v. United States Shoe Mach. Corp., 316 U.S. 364, 384 (1942) (Black, J. dissenting).
261. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
262. Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792, 798.
263. The post-Hotchkiss history of the patentability standard fails to disclose any defi-
nite conception of implicit limitations on congressional discretion in article I, section 8, and at
most contains scattered references to the general constitutional purpose fulfilled by the patent
statutes. See, e.g., Thompson v. Boisselier, 114 U.S. 1 (1885); Hollister v. Benedict & Burn-
ham Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59, 73 (1885). Neither decision contains any discussion of a constitu-
tional requirement distinct from the statutory standard fashioned by Congress, or indicates that
Congress is limited by the statement of purpose in the intellectual property clause in selecting
a minimum patentability standard.
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recognizing an implicit constitutional limitation on congressional
power to define the conditions for patentability. "64 Only with the ap-
pearance of antimonopolist fervor in the Court during the 1940's
was the theory of an implicit limitation in the preamble of the intel-
lectual property clause developed, leading to the concurring opinion
in Great At. and Pac. Tea Co..25
It is noteworthy that the Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co. concur-
ring opinion itself identifies no precedent supporting its constitu-
tional theory that the legislative power to grant patents is "qualified"
by the statement of purpose contained in article I, section 8, or that
the standard of patentability is constitutional rather than statu-
tory.2" Neither the cases cited in support of the "inventive genius"
standard2 67 nor Justice Bradley's antimonopolist credo from Atlantic
Works v. Brady... rests on a constitutional basis. Furthermore, none
of the twenty Supreme Court cases cited as invalidating "flimsy and
spurious" patents2 9 so much as refers to the asserted "constitutional
264. Any doubt as to whether the intellectual property clause, in distinction to the re-
maining enumerated powers of article I, was historically regarded as implying hidden constitu-
tional prohibitions based on an intrinsic constitutional antagonism to limited patent rights,
should be dispelled by the affirmative declaration in McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.)
202 (1843) that
the power of Congress to legislate upon the subject of patents is plenary by the
terms of the Constitution, and as there are no restraints on its exercise, there
can be no limitation of their right to modify [the patent laws] at their pleasure,
so long as they do not take away the rights of property in existing patents.
Id. at 206. See also United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 583 (1899).
265. The impact on the Supreme Court of patent pooling practices during the Great
Depression is described in Gregg, Tracing the Concept of'Patentable Invention,' 13 VILL. L.
REV. 98, 104-06 (1967). Cf Williams Mfg. Co. v. United States Shoe Mach. Corp., 316 U.S.
364, 380-82 (1942) (Black, J., dissenting, joined by Justices Douglas and Murphy).
266. 340 U.S. at 154-55.
267. Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941); Mantle Lamp
Co. v. Aluminum Prods. Co., 301 U.S. 544 (1937); Concrete Appliances Co. v. Gomery, 269
U.S. 177 (1925); Potts v. Creager, 155 U.S. 597 (1895); Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347
(1876); Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674 (1893).
268. The concurring opinion approvingly refers to Justice Bradley's condemnation in
Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883) of the "indiscriminate creation of exclusive
privileges" under the patent laws that has the effect of creating "a class of speculative schemers
who make it their business to watch the advancing wave of improvement, and gather its foam
in the form of patented monopolies, which enable them to lay a heavy tax upon the industry of
the country, without contributing anything to the real advancement of the arts." Great Atd.
and Pac. Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 155.
269. Dunham v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 154 U.S. 103 (1894); Morgan Envelope Co. v.
Albany Paper Co., 152 U.S. 425 (1894); Knapp v. Morss, 150 U.S. 221 (1893); Pope Mfg.
Co. v. Gormully Mfg. Co., 144 U.S. 238 (1892); Patent Clothing Co. v. Glover, 141 U.S. 560(1891); Adams v. Bellaire Stamping Co., 141 U.S. 539 (1891); Cluett v. Claffin, 140 U.S. 180
(1891); Shenfield v. Nashawannuck Mfg. Co., 137 U.S. 56 (1890); Florsheim v. Schilling, 137
U.S. 64 (1890); St. Germain v. Brunswick, 135 U.S. 227 (1890); Hendy v. Miner's Iron
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standards which are supposed to govern" determinations of patent
validity.""
Instead, the Graham Court discerns a constitutional "standard"
in the statement of purpose of the intellectual property clause based
upon the "stated purpose of the Framers.""71 Although there is no
evidence indicating the intentions2 72  or identities27  of the actual
framers of the intellectual property clause, the Court offers an imag-
inative reconstruction based principally upon the letters of Thomas
Jefferson.274 Jefferson's preeminence in the Court's history of pat-
entability is based on his experience in reviewing patent applications
under the 1790 Patent Act as Secretary of State2 75 and as the "au-
thor" of the 1793 Patent Act.' 70 However, the Court's historical
analysis of the nonobviousness requirement overlooks Congress' ex-
press rejection of the defense, included by Jefferson in the draft 1793
Patent Act, that an invention "is so unimportant and obvious that it
ought not be the subject of an exclusive right. '277 Jefferson's un-
heeded proposals for restriction, if not elimination, of the intellectual
property power28 indicate that his opinions were shared neither by
Works, 127 U.S. 370 (1888); Preston v. Manard, 116 U.S. 661 (1886); Miller v. Force, 116
U.S. 22 (1885); Double-Pointed Tack Co. v. Two Rivers Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 117 (1883);
Dalton v. Jennings, 93 U.S. 271 (1876); Reckendorfer, 92 U.S. at 347; Brown v. Piper, 91
.U.S. 37 (1875); Union Paper Collar Co. v. Van Dusen, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 530 (1875); Rub-
ber Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498 (1874); Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52
U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851). The vintage of these cases is apparent; with the exception of
Hotchkiss they stem from the post-Civil War period of antimonopolist fervor which culminated
in the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890. See generally Letwin, Congress and the Sher-
man Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221, 232-35 (1956).
270. Great Ati. and Pac. Tea Co., 340 U.S. at 158.
271. 383 U.S. at 6.
272. The intellectual property clause was adopted without debate at the Constitutional
Convention, and there was no reference to it in the minutes of the drafting Committee. See
Fenning, supra note 96, at 443.
273. Charles Pinckney of South Carolina and James Madison both submitted proposals
for copyright and patent powers to the Constitutional Convention, but the language adopted
does not correspond to any of their suggestions. The more general language of the intellectual
property clause originated in the Committee of Eleven, and the identity of its drafter is un-
known. Fenning, supra note 96, at 441-42.
274. The course of Jefferson's changing thoughts on the benefit of patents is traced in
Graham, 383 U.S. at 7-8. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
275. Graham, 383 U.S. at 6-7.
276. Id.
277. 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Draft of a Proposed Bill to Promote
the Progress of the Useful Arts 279 (Ford ed. 1895).
278. Jefferson, who was in France during the Constitutional Convention in the summer
of 1787, played no role in the drafting of the Constitution. He promptly responded to the
adoption of the intellectual property clause with a proposal for its effective repeal by a bill of
rights provision which would prohibit any "monopolies," including those for a limited term
intended to stimulate "ingenuity." See 6 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to
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the Framers of the Constitution nor the Congresses that drafted the
Bill of Rights and the first patent act." 9
The absence of an historical constitutional nonobviousness re-
quirement is of course not dispositive of the issue whether the Su-
preme Court should now impose a constitutional limit on the legisla-
tive power to secure exclusive rights in useful articles. Recent history
is replete with examples of constitutional limitations declared by the
Court in its role of expounding and adapting the basic law to meet
changed political, social and economic circumstances, even though it
departs from the intentions of the Framers. 280 The intellectual prop-
erty clause is no exception to the rule that has provided the judiciary
with latitude in redefining constitutional terms in an attempt to de-
velop "evolving standards . . . that mark the progress of a maturing
society."2 ' In a famous early statement, Judge Learned Hand re-
jected the theory that the copyright clause "embalms inflexibly the
habits of 1789" in defining the intellectual property power of Con-
gress, maintaining instead that the
Madison (July, 1788) 47 (Ford ed. 1895); see also 4 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
Letter to Madison (Dec. 1787) 476 (Ford ed. 1895). This suggestion was rejected by the
drafters of the Bill of Rights in Congress, along with Jefferson's later proposal for a ninth
article to the Constitution which would have permitted limited "monopolies" for literary pro-
ductions and inventions. 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Letter to Madison (Au-
gust 1789) 113 (Ford ed. 1895). The correspondence is paraphrased by the Court in Graham,
383 U.S. at 7-8.
279. In Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., the Supreme Court emphasized the importance
of early legislation to the proper construction of the intellectual property clause:
The construction placed upon the Constitution by the first act of 1790, and the
act of 1802, by the men who were contemporary with its formation, many of
whom were members of the convention which framed it, is of itself entitled to
very great weight, and when it is remembered that the rights thus established
have not been disputed during a period of nearly a century, it is almost
conclusive.
111 U.S. at 57.
280. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of privacy requires right of
elective abortion in first trimester of pregnancy); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)
(discretionary death penalty violates eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) (constitutional right of privacy under
ninth amendment); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (equal protection clause of four-
teenth amendment requires apportionment of seats in both houses of bicameral state legisla-
tures on a population basis).
281. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). The present discussion is not con-
cerned with the legitimacy or wisdom of this doctrine. It instead acknowledges the fact that the
Supreme Court has consistently applied the metaphor of a "living" Constitution, according to
which judicial reinterpretation of concepts such as due process, equal protection, and cruel and
unusual punishment has largely replaced amendment as the practical method of constitutional
development. See Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703
(1975); Reid, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REV. 673 (1963).
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grants of power to Congress comprise, not only what was then
known, but what the ingenuity of men should devise thereafter.
Of course, the new subject-matter must have some relation to
the grant; but we interpret it by the general practices of civilized
peoples in similar fields, for it is not a straight-jacket, but a
charter for a living people. 2"O
The issue now addressed is whether the judiciary should exer-
cise this discretion by establishing a constitutional patentability re-
quirement, and specifically a threshold nonobviousness requirement,
in the direction indicated by Graham.2 8
In determining this issue of crucial importance to intellectual
property law, the constitutional element of the Graham opinion
should be entitled to little precedential weight. The validity of the
patent at issue in that case2 " could be determined on the basis of the
statutory standards in effect, and no question of the constitutionality
of the patentability standard imposed under section 103 was prop-
erly before the Court for its consideration."' 5 In venturing an opin-
ion on constitutional requirements not necessary to the decision, the
Graham Court departed from its own well-settled rules that a case
should be disposed of on a statutory basis if possible, 2 " and that the
282. Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. 717, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). Cf
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 (1908) (under the due process clause, seventeenth
century criminal procedure is not "fastened upon the American jurisprudence like a straight
jacket, only to be unloosed by constitutional amendment").
283. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
284. As indeed the validity of the patents at issue in Great Atd. and Pacific Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equip. Co., 340 U.S. 147 (1950); Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Sal-
vage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969); Thompson v. Boisselier, 114 U.S. 1 (1885); Hollister v. Bene-
dict & Burnham Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59 (1885) and every other Supreme Court patent validity
case with constitutional overtones.
285. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 206 n.5, 208 n.6 (1954) (declining to consider
whether copyrighted statuettes were constitutional "writings" when this question was not
raised in the petition for certiorari).
286. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring):
The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which
the case may be disposed of. . . . Thus, if a case can be decided on either of
two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of
statutory construction, the Court will decide only the latter.
Id. at 347. Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion remains one of the most authoritative descrip-
tions of the rules fashioned and used by the Court to avoid passing on constitutional issues. As
he instructed,
[clonsiderations of propriety as well as long-established practice, demand that
we refrain from passing upon the constitutionality of an act of Congress unless
obliged to do so in the proper performance of our judicial function, when the
question is raised by a party whose interests entitle him to raise it.
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Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance
of the necessity of deciding it."s Indeed, the Graham admonitions
regarding a "standard expressed in the Constitution [which] may
not be ignored" ' are so vague as to provide little indication of any
actual limit on the power to legislate. Moreover, they illustrate the
danger inherent in an unnecessary judicial excursus into the consti-
tutional realm,
upon issues which remain unfocused because they are not
pressed before the Court with that clear concreteness provided
when a question emerges precisely framed and necessary for de- -'
cision from a clash of adversary argument exploring every as-
pect of a multi-faced situation embracing conflicting and de-
manding interests. .... 28.
However, the Graham dicta require careful reexamination because
they indicate an approach that might be followed when the issue of a
constitutional nonobviousness requirement is first litigated in the
context of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act.
By expressly negating any requirement that mask works be
nonobvious as a precondition for registration, the Chip Act squarely
raises the issue of whether "originality" is a constitutionally suffi-
cient threshold minimum difference for securing exclusive rights in a
useful article. The constitutionality of the Act turns on the question
of whether Congress could provide exclusive rights in mask works by
fashioning a substantially lower standard than nonobviousness. Be-
cause Congress endorsed the industry view that the patent standard
was unattainable for most mask works, 90 and considered that the
continued viability of the United States semiconductor industry de-
pended on affording legal protection to chip designs under a lower
threshold standard, resolution of the constitutional issue will be
Id. at 341 (citation omitted). Accord Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99 (1981).
287. Ashwander, 297 U.S. at 346-47 (quoting Liverpool, N.Y. & Phila. S.S. Co. v.
Emigration Comm'rs, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1885)); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 45 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). In Reid, Justice Frankfurter stated in his dissent that when the
Court passes on the constitutionality of an act of Congress, two rules are required
to which [the Court] has rigidly adhered, one, never to anticipate a question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it; the other, never to
formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise
facts to which it is to be applied.
Id. See generally Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1247
(1987); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 555-57; Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264,
294-95 (1981).
288. Graham, 383 U.S. at 6.
289. United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961).
290. See supra note 46.
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likely to have a profound effect on the progress of the useful arts.
A. The Article I, Section 8 Model
The patent power, like the taxing and spending power, 9' the
borrowing power,292 the bankruptcy power 298 and the commerce
power,294 is a plenary economic power vested by the Constitution in
the legislative branch. Resolution of the ultimate issue of the consti-
tutional power of Congress to fix the standard of patentability re-
quires that the intellectual property clause be considered in its article
I, section 8 context.
Historically, federal authority has been chiefly defined by the
taxing and commerce powers and the constitutional necessary and
proper clause. 95 Judicial construction of the parallel article I, sec-
tion 8 economic powers 296 provides a reliable guide to discovering
those "limitations ...prescribed in the Constitution" 29'7 that may
restrict exercise of congressional discretion in defining the legislative
measures necessary and proper for carrying into execution the enu-
merated intellectual property power.
Such limitations may be of various types.2 98 Each enumerated
power is subject to external limitations imposed by the other provi-
.sions of the Constitution .29  Further structural limitations prevent an
291. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
292. Id. § 8, cl. 2.
293. Id. § 8, cl. 4.
294. Id. § 8, cl. 3.
295. See C. BLACK, PERSPECTIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 21 (1963) [hereinafter
BLACK].
296. The article 1, section 8 economic powers provide a better standard of congressional
power under the intellectual property clause than the other enumerated powers such as the
powers to declare war and regulate the military (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11-14) and the
naturalization power (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4). The Court has consistently refused to
intervene and require a congressional declaration of war as a prequisite to the use of military
forces. See Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Mora v.
MacNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2
Black) 635, 669-70 (1863); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (three-judge
court), affd, 411 U.S. 911 (1973). Congressional exercise of the immigration power is largely
beyond judicial review, see Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 799 n.8 (1977); Shaughnessy v. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953); Chinese Exclusion Cases, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), and the executive
enjoys broad discretion in conducting foreign policy. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996
(1979); United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-18 (1936).
297. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824).
298. Professor Lawrence Tribe uses the term "external" to refer to structural limits and
to express constitutional restrictions such as those in the Bill of Rights, and the term "inter-
nal" to describe limits inherent in the grants of power themselves. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 224 (1978) [hereinafter TRIBE).
299. See supra notes 229-57 and accompanying text.
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enumerated power from being exercised so as to impair the essential
governmental structure established by the Constitution, whether for
the preservation of the federal-state government relationship,"' the
division of powers within the federal government,'0 1 or the separate
powers confided to the federal government.302 Finally, internal limits
within the individual grants of power place restrictions upon their
exercise. Internal limits may be reasonably explicit, such as the pro-
vision that no appropriation of money to raise and support armies
shall be for a longer term than two years, 80 or they may be more
ambiguous, such as the provision that Congress may regulate com-
merce "among the several states."30 4
External limitations on the exercise of the intellectual property
power are of little significance in the present discussion. Since the
early unsuccessful attempts to declare patent extensions unconstitu-
tional as ex post facto laws, 05 express external constitutional limits
have played little role in the development of patent law. The most
significant external limitations operating upon the intellectual prop-
erty power are the first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech
and of the press which operate as potential limits on the copyright
power.306 The effect of these external limits remains largely conjec-
300. See, e.g., Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513(1936) (bankruptcy power); Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 565 (1911) (U.S. CONST. art.
4, § 3 admission power); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895) (taxing
power); Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501 (1879) (patent power).
301. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Sinar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3191-92 (1986) (improper delegation
of executive power to officer of legislative branch); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (uni-
cameral legislative veto violates requirement of bicameralism); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
124-40 (1976) (legislative appointment to executive offices unconstitutional); Panama Ref. Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (improper delegation of legislative power to executive).
302. See, e.g., Brown v. Duquesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195, 197 (1857) (power to
grant patents held domestic in character and necessarily confined within the limits of the
United States, in order to avoid interfering with power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and treaty-making power).
303. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
304. Examples of express internal limitations include the restriction that exclusive rights
may be secured under the intellectual property clause "for limited times"; the requirement of
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 that "all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout
the United States;" the similar provision of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4, that naturalization
and bankruptcy laws be "uniform ...throughout the United States;" and the reservation to
the states of "the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia" pro-
vided by U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
305. See, e.g., McClurg v. Kingsland 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843); Grant v. Raymond,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 230 (1832); Bloomer v. Stolley, 3 F. Cas. 729 (C.C.D. Ohio 1850) (No.
1,559); Evans v. Jordan, 8 F. Cas. 872 (C.C.D. Vir. 1813) (No. 4,564), affd, 13 U.S. (9
Cranch) 199 (1815).
306. See Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free
Speech and the Press?, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1180 (1970); Goldstein, Copyright and the First
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tural, since the statutory provision permitting fair use of copyrighted
works8 7 has been invoked to avoid conflict with the first amend-
ment, 808 and the Supreme Court has declined to discover a conflict
between the purposes of copyright law and those of the first amend-
ment. 09 The restrictions that are of most interest in the present dis-
cussion of the intellectual property power are internal limitations,
particularly limits implied from statements of purpose accompanying
grants of power, and those imposed by the narrowing judicial defini-
tion of specific terms used in the individual grants.
B. Limits Derived from Statements of Constitutional Purpose
In its current interpretation of the intellectual property clause,
the Supreme Court suggests a limitation on congressional power that
allows Congress to secure exclusive rights in discoveries derived only
from the purpose served by its exercise, i.e., "to promote the progress
of . . useful arts."310 This coupling of a grant of power with lan-
guage expressive of purpose is not unique in article I, section 8. It
has several counterparts in the same constitutional section: (1) the
power to impose taxes and pay debts to "provide for the common
defence and general welfare of the United States;" 11 (2) the power
"[t]o make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the foregoing powers and all other powers vested by
this Constitution in the government of the United States;-"3 2 and (3)
the power to exercise exclusive legislation in places purchased "for
the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards and other need-
ful buildings."3 13 In each instance a statement of purpose accompa-
nies the grant of power. In interpreting these parallel provisions, the
Court has rejected the theory that such a statement of purpose
should be construed to express an implied limit on Congressional
Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A
Gathering Storm?, 19 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 43 (1971); Note, Copyright Infringe-
ment and the First Amendment, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 320 (1979).
307. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
308. See Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1968); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp.
130 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
309. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985);
cf. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 107 S. Ct. 2971
(1987) (trademark).
310. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966).
311. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
312. Id. § 8, cl. 18.
313. Id. § 8, cl. 17.
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exercise of the power.
In McCulloch v. Maryland, the Supreme Court first addressed
the question of whether the statement of purpose in the necessary
and proper clause served to limit the lawmaking power of the federal
government. " ' There, Maryland contended that the incorporation of
the second Bank of. America was unconstitutional because no enu-
merated power authorizes the federal government to establish banks,
and because the necessary and proper clause limits the power to pass
laws by permitting only enactments that are strictly necessary to exe-
cute the specifically enumerated powers.'15 In an analysis not re-
stricted to the necessary and proper clause, the Court denied that
constitutional grants of power are themselves limitations, considering
instead: "If we apply this principle of construction to any of the
powers of the government, we shall find it so pernicious in its opera-
tion that we shall be compelled to discard it."" 6
The fundamental and opposite principle of constitutional con-
struction announced in McCulloch was based upon pragmatic con-
siderations, as well as the general character and internal arrange-
ment of the Constitution. Recognizing the importance of the "ample
powers, on the due execution of which the happiness and prosperity
of the nation so vitally depends," 1 " Chief Justice Marshall con-
cluded as a practical matter that the interests of the nation require
the facilitation, rather than the limitation of their exercise, and that
the Constitution cannot be presumed "to clog and embarrass" the
execution of the enumerated powers "by withholding the most ap-
propriate means."38" The limitation-in-grant theory conflicted both
with public policy and with the intentions of the Framers:
The subject is the execution of those great powers on which the
welfare of a nation essentially depends. It must have been the
intention of those who gave these powers, to insure, as far as
human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution. This
could not be done, by confiding the choice of means to such nar-
row limits as not to leave it in the power of congress to adopt
any which might be appropriate, and which were conducive to
the end. This provision is made in a constitution, intended to
endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the means
314. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
315. Id. at 412-14.
316. Id. at 416 (emphasis added).
317. Id. at 408.
318. Id.
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by which government should, in all future time, execute its
powers, would have been to change, entirely, the character of
the instrument, and give it the properties of a legal code. It
would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable
rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been
seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur.819
Additional support for this conclusion was derived from the inclusion
of the necessary and proper clause in article I, section 8, a constitu-
tional section which grants, rather than restricts, the powers of the
legislature.830
In rejecting the view that the grant of power implied any limi-
tation,821 Chief Justice Marshall established the principle that the
necessary and proper clause expands the great enumerated powers,
giving the Legislature wide discretion in selecting the means neces-
sary to carry out the specifically enumerated powers.82 The doctrine
that the enumerated powers of the federal government are aug-
mented by implied powers under the necessary and proper clause,
and its corollary that the enumerated grants should not be narrowly
construed by the judiciary, 2" have been the constitutional corner-
stone for the expansion of federal power under the commerce and
taxing powers.
Since McCulloch, the most frequently litigated potential restric-
tion on an enumerated power has been the parallel statement of pur-
pose that Congress may tax and spend "to . . provide for the...
general welfare.""24 Challenges to federal tax legislation illustrate
the sometimes wavering principle of judicial deference to legislative
judgment, but even in the era of Hammer v. Dagenhart,25 the
Court did not depart from the cardinal principle that statements of
purpose do not limit the enumerated powers.
Adhering to Chief Justice Marshall's broad conception of enu-
319. Id. at 415.
320. Id. at 419-20.
321. Id. at 415.
322. Id. at 421.
323. "[Where the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of the
objects intrusted to the government, to undertake here to inquire into the degree of its neces-
sity, would be to pass the line which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on
legislative ground." Id. at 423.
324. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
325. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). This case is often cited as epitomizing the Court's willing-
ness, during the period from In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488 (1905), to Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238 (1936), to strike down federal economic legislation enacted under the taxing and
commerce powers by applying freestanding notions of a sphere of police power and economic
regulation reserved to the states.
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merated federal powers, the Court in McCray v. United States 26
reaffirmed that the taxing power is plenary, 27 not strictly limited to
the purpose of raising revenue, 2' and may be exercised even to ac-
complish a collateral regulatory purpose.3 2' The Court's deference to
congressional judgment s and its reluctance to probe legislative mo-
tive were overcome in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.."' There, the
Court invalidated a tax on companies employing child labor332 as an
impermissible attempt to regulate purely local matters within the po-
lice power of the states."' In reaching a decision on the basis of the
tenth amendment"' it was unnecessary to consider the scope of the
general welfare clause. However, in later striking down a New Deal
cotton processing tax835 on the similar ground that it invaded the
province of agricultural production reserved to the states, the Court
in United States v. Butler" reached and rejected a narrow reading
of the general welfare clause. In that case, the Court resolved the
long debated issue of construction1 7 in favor of an independent fed-
326. 195 U.S. 27 (1904). The Court sustained a tax of ten cents per pound on artifi-
cially colored oleomargarine as compared with one-quarter cent per pound on white margarine
despite objections that the legislation resulted from the impermissible motive of suppressing
manufacture of colored margarine, rather than raising tax revenue. Id. at 51.
327. Id. at 56-57.
328. Id. at 51.
329. "The decisions of this Court lend no support whatsoever to the assumption that the
judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose
or motive has caused the power to be exerted." Id. at 56. See also United States v. Doremus,
249 U.S. 86 (1919) (upholding registration and record-keeping provisions imposed, in addition
to payment of special tax on sales of narcotics, by the Harrison Narcotic Drug Act of 1914, ch.
1, 38 Stat. 785).
330. The Court considered that declaring an act within a conferred power to be
unconstitutional
[blecause it appeared to the judicial mind that the particular exertion of consti-
tutional power was either unwise or unjust . . . would be to overthrow the
entire distinction between the legislative, judicial and executive departments of
the government, upon which our system is founded, and would be a mere act of
judicial usurpation.
McCray, 195 U.S. at 54.
331. 259 U.S. 20 (1922) ("Child Labor Tax Case").
332. A tax of 10% of net annual profits was imposed on any manufacturing firm em-
ploying child labor under Title 12 of the Revenue Act of Feb. 24, 1919, ch. 18, § 1200, 40
Stat. 1057, 1138.
333. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 37 (1922).
334. Id. at 38.
335. The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, ch. 25, § 9, 48 Stat. 31, 35, imposed a
tax on the first processing of cotton, and further provided for payment of the proceeds to cotton
farmers to secure reduced acreage.
336. 297 U.S. 1 (1936).
337. Madison asserted that the general welfare clause amounts to nothing more than a
reference to the other powers enumerated in the subsequent clauses of the same section, and
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eral power to spend limited only by the internal requirement that
spending be for the general welfare."' 8 In holding the cotton tax un-
constitutional, it was not necessary to determine the scope of the
" 'general welfare of the United States' [limitation] or to determine
whether an appropriation in aid of agriculture falls within it. ""9
Butler was decided on the alternate basis that the legislation imper-
missibly invaded the power to regulate agricultural production re-
served to the states by the tenth amendment.340 The spending power
was thus limited not by an internal restriction, but by the external
limits imposed to preserve the federal-state relationship, and prevent
the "total subversion of the governmental powers reserved to the in-
dividual states." 18 ' In subsequently sustaining a factually indistin-
guishable tax on coconut oil production 42 for the benefit of the gov-
ernment of the Philippines, 4" the Court once again stressed the
breadth of the power to promote the general welfare344 and the con-
stitutional discretion of Congress,4 ' without recognizing a judicially
that the grant of the power to tax and spend for the national general welfare must be confined
to the enumerated legislative fields committed to Congress. See United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 65 (1937) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 41 (Madison)). Hamilton, followed by Justice
Story, asserted that the clause confers a power distinct from those subsequently enumerated
and is not restricted in meaning. He concluded that Congress has a substantive power to tax
and to appropriate, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for the
general welfare of the United States. See Id. at 65-66 (citing THE FEDERALIST Nos. 30, 34
(Hamilton)). The Court adopted Justice Story's view, that "[the power of Congress to author-
ize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of
legislative power found in the Constitution." Id. at 66.
338. Although it did not attempt to delineate possible internal limits imposed by the
general welfare clause, the Court indicated the breadth of the power by referring to the
"[w]ide range of discretion permitted to Congress. How great is the extent of that range, when
the subject is the promotion of the general welfare of the United States, we need hardly re-
mark." Id. at 67. See Justice Stone's comment that "[tihe constitutional power of Congress to
levy an excise tax upon the processing of agricultural products is not questioned." Id. at 79
(dissenting).
339. Id. at 68.
340. d.
341. Id. at 75.
342. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 602 , 48 Stat. 763.
343. Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308 (1937).
344. The measure was sustained as an act in discharge of a moral "debt" within the
meaning of the taxation clause. Id. at 315.
345. Considering whether the tax or appropriation was for the constitutional purpose
"to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United
States," the Court stated, "primarily, and in a very high degree, whether a tax serves any of
these purposes is a practical question addressed to the law-making department. And it will
require a very plain case to warrant the courts in setting aside the conclusion of Congress in
that regard." Id. at 313. The Court further stated, "queries directly or indirectly challenging
the wisdom or necessity of the Congressional action, are all matters, as we have repeatedly
pointed out, with which the courts have nothing to do." Id. at 324.
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enforceable internal limit in the language of the grant. 4"
The authority of Drexel Furniture Co. and Bailey was greatly
eroded by subsequent decisions upholding social security taxes
against tenth amendment challenges. 47 Confirming that the unem-
ployment benefit tax"4 ' and the old age security tax"O are within the
national purpose of providing for the general welfare 5 ' and do not
contravene external limitations on the exercise of federal power by
the tenth35 1 or fifth 5 amendments, these cases indicate that the re-
maining internal limit that a tax or spending measure must serve a
general, rather than a merely local, purpose 53 is not a static, histori-
cally determined limit 5  but a matter "in which discretion is at
large. The discretion, however, is not confided to the courts. The
discretion belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a
display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment. ' '3 55
While maintaining in principle that spending must promote the
general welfare, the Court has declined to assume any significant
role in overseeing whether particular legislation fulfills this pur-
pose,' 5' or to find a limitation in the grant of power. In Buckley v.
Valeo, 57 opponents of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971"' urged that public financing of presidential elections' 59 was
"contrary to the general welfare" clause.' 60 Citing McCulloch, the
346. Since the Philippines were a dependency of the federal government, rather, than a
state, the federal-state structural limitations earlier invoked in Butler were inapplicable. Cin-
cinnati Soap, 301 U.S. at 312, 317.
347. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (unemployment compensa-
tion); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (old age benefits). At least with respect to
economic matters affecting private entities, the tenth amendment was declared a "truism" inef-
fective to limit the declared legislative powers in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124
(1941).
348. Imposed by Title IX of the Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620, 622
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1109 (Supp. 11 1984)).
349. Title II of the Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620, 622 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (Supp. 1986)).
350. Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 586-87; Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640-41.
351. Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 585, 593.
352. Id. at 548, 583-84.
353. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640.
354. Id. at 641.
355. Id. at 640; accord Bowen v. Gilliard, 107 S. Ct. 3008, 3015 (1987); Bowen v.
Owens, 476 U.S. 340, 345 (1986).
356. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793, 2796 (1987); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 90, 91 (1976); United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
357. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
358. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984); 18 U.S.C. §§ 591-607 (1982).
359. Established by Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. §§
6096, 9001-9012, 9031-9042 (Supp. 11 1984).
360. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91.
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Court disagreed, stating that this contention "erroneously treats the
General Welfare Clause as a limitation upon congressional power. It
is rather a grant of power, the scope of which is quite expansive,
particularly in view of the enlargement of power by the Necessary
and Proper Clause."" 1
Judicial consideration of the remaining statement of purpose in
article I, section 8, although less frequently litigated, confirms the
rule of construction followed since McCulloch. The power to exer-
cise exclusive legislation over all places purchased "by the consent of
the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erec-
tion of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock-yards and other needful
buildings"" 2 has not prevented the exercise of exclusive jurisdiction
over land taken for other than the enumerated purposes, including
forests, parks, ranges, wildlife sanctuaries, and flood control.8""
Even in the brief era when the Court freely applied external
limits, since repudiated, to restrict broad congressional power in se-
lecting tax and commerce measures necessary and proper to promote
social welfare goals, it refused to discover limits in the constitutional
statements of purpose."
C. Limits Derived from Constitutional Nomenclature
Although the Supreme Court has declined to derive implied
limits on federal authority from article I, section 8 statements of pur-
pose, a semantic or taxonomic approach was employed in the early
decades of this century to fashion internal limits on the enumerated
powers. According to this approach, congressional power was nar-
rowed by restrictive judicial definition of the terms granting enumer-
ated powers. The reach of federal power depended not on policy
considerations, such as whether unforeseen exigencies arising in "the
crises of human affairs" ' required the exercise of commensurate
powers to preserve "the happiness and prosperity of the nation,"' 6
but rather on whether the activity regulated was beyond the often
procrustean definition supplied by judicial exegesis. Determination
of the scope of federal powers threatened to devolve into little more
361. Id.
362. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
363. See Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 529-30 (1938).
364. Professor Tribe considers that the development of admiralty law illustrates in mi-
crocosm the decline of the Court's willingness to find implied restrictions in grants of power.
See TRIBE, supra note 298, at 230 n.13.
365. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
366. Id. at 408.
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than an ad hoc exercise in nomenclature or labelling, without sub-
stantive relation to the genuinely federal interest in regulating eco-
nomic matters affecting more states than one, and beyond the control
of any.
The rise and decline of such semantic limits is well-illustrated
by judicial construction of the commerce power. Since Gibbons v.
Ogden,s6 the judiciary has labored to delineate the confines of the
power conferred, by considering the terms "regulate," "commerce"
and "among the several States." Chief Justice Marshall adopted a
broad definition of these terms in Gibbons, directly rejecting the sug-
gestion that "commerce" was limited to "buying and selling, or the
interchange of commodities," thus by definition excluding naviga-
tion.3 " The power granted to "regulate" was interpreted in a simi-
larly comprehensive manner, as the "plenary" power to prescribe the
rule by which commerce is to be governed."6 9 The critical phrase
"among the several States" was construed expansively, although in
somewhat less definite terms. While any intrastate activity "affect-
ing" other states could be the subject of regulation by Congress, a
residual sphere of purely intrastate activity preserved from federal
regulation was also posited.17 0 Chief Justice Marshall thus declined
to limit the commerce clause by confining its terms within any static
definition. Instead, he adopted a pragmatic and flexible test for de-
termining whether an activity conducted within a state "affects" the
commerce of other states, and for this reason properly falls within
the sphere of national regulatory authority.
In the absence of significant nineteenth-century commerce
clause regulation clearly extending beyond interstate transporta-
tion,87 1 the broad definition applied by Chief Justice Marshall was
generally followed by the Court in upholding federal power to regu-
late such aspects of interstate commerce as maintaining the naviga-
bility of rivers, 1 2 licensing ships on intrastate waters carrying goods
in the flow of interstate commerce, 73 and intrastate telegraph com-
367. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
368. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189-90 (1824).
369. Id. at 196-97.
370. Id. at 194-95.
371. The era of modern federal economic regulation began with the Interstate Com-
merce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-11917) and the
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-5
(Supp. III 1985)).
372. See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421
(1856).
373. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 565 (1871).
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munications.87 4 Congress was accorded discretion in determining
whether intrastate activities affected interstate commerce, particu-
larly in regulation of the monopolistic railroad industry, and the
Court sustained federal requirements for safety equipment on rail-
roads operating intrastate, 75 regulation of intrastate rates,8 76 and
maximum hour provisions for railroad workers. 8 7
The era of judicial deference came to an end with the enactment
of general economic measures extending beyond the regulation of the
flow of goods in interstate commerce.8 78 In United States v. E. C.
Knight Co.,871 the Court construed the Sherman Act by referencing
the commerce clause, applying a narrowing definition of commerce
that excluded manufacturing. "Commerce," the Court declared,
"succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it."88 In selecting a
restrictive and formalistic definition, rather than inquiring whether
the monopolization of the United States sugar industry would be
conduct that would "extend to or affect other States,"8 the Court
departed from the functional inquiry required by Gibbons.8 ' This
foreshadowed a judicial willingness to find implied semantic limita-
tions on the legislative economic powers that characterized the fol-
374. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 122 U.S. 347 (1887); cf Pensacola Tel.
Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1878) (state cannot grant a monopoly on intrastate
telegraph service).
375. See Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 26 (1911).
376. See Houston, E. & W. Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) ("Shreve-
port Rate Case").
377. See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. ICC, 221 U.S. 612 (1911).
378. There is a lack of agreement as to when the era of judicial retrenchment from
Gibbons commenced. Charles Black considers that the "picture was until 1918 completely con-
sistent" and that until then the "cases seemed to say with one voice that Congress might make
access to interstate commerce conditional on any factors it liked." BLACK, supra note 295, at
25. However, according to Archibald Cox, the restrictive interpretation of the commerce power
dates from the Civil War. Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U.
CIN. L. REV. 199, 224 (1971) [hereinafter Cox]. Professor Tribe concludes that beginning in
1887 the Court was required to judge the limits of congressional power and that the view of
the commerce clause that developed contrasted sharply with the approach in Gibbons. Tribe,
supra note 298, at 234. The conclusion reached by Professor Tribe is the view adopted by the
Supreme Court in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 121-22 (1942).
379. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). The government sued to prevent the American Sugar Company
from acquiring four Pennsylvania sugar refining companies in order to obtain control of
ninety-eight percent of the sugar refining capacity of the United States. Id. at 3.
380. Id. at 12. The Court further indicated that the "fact that an article is manufac-
tured for export to another State does not of itself make it an article of interstate commerce."
Id. at 13.
381. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824).
382. See United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 19 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing); see also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 332 (1936) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
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lowing forty years."' 3
During this period, and particularly after Hammer v.
Dagenhart,3 " the Court repeatedly invalidated federal legislation as
exceeding its self-imposed definitional limits on the term "com-
merce," under which production was considered prior to interstate
commerce 3 5 and intrastate distribution and sale were held to take
place after interstate commerce had ceased. 6 Judicial manipulation
of constitutional nomenclature reached its fullest height in Carter v.
Carter Coal Co.,"' where the Court exempted broad aspects of pro-
duction from federal commerce power regulation with the
explanation:
We have seen that the word "commerce" is the equivalent of
the phrase "intercourse for the purposes of trade." . . . The
employment of men, the fixing of their wages, hours of labor
and working conditions, the bargaining in respect of these
things-whether carried on separately or collectively-each and
all constitute intercourse for the purposes of production, not of
trade. The latter is a thing apart from the relation of employer
and employee, which in all producing occupations is purely lo-
cal in character.M
This hair-splitting judicial exercise in semantics had its counterpart
under the taxation clause, where the distinction between a "tax" and
a "penalty" was applied to restrict the exercise of the taxing power
to ends approved by the Court." 9
Clearly driven by the judicial conviction that the Constitution
reserved large areas of economic and labor regulation immune from
383. The restriction announced in Knight did not prove fatal to enforcement of the
Sherman Act. Since Knight was subsequently distinguished on its facts as involving only the
intrastate purchase of manufacturing facilities, the Act was repeatedly held applicable to inter-
state markets and regulation of the "current of commerce among the states." See, e.g., Loewe
v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 297 (1908); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 397-99
(1905); Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 329 (1904); Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 238-40 (1899).
384. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
385. Id. at 272 (1918) (furniture manufacture); Carter, 298 U.S. at 309 (mining); cf.
Butler, 297 U.S. at 1 (agriculture); Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210,
235 (1932) (oil production).
386. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
387. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
388. Id. at 303.
389. See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922). Cf Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 540-45 (1985) (distinction between "proprie-
tary" and "governmental" activities employed in tax immunity cases later abandoned because
of its uncertainty and instability).
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government interference, 9" the static and narrowing definition of
commerce propounded by the Court enabled it to interpose its judg-
ment on the wisdom of congressional policy decisions, which were
regarded as displacing state prerogatives.3 ' It is often suggested that
the semantic distinctions that had been applied, such as the judicial
splitting of economic activity into commerce and manufacture, and
the subsidiary criterion of direct versus indirect effect on interstate
commerce, 892 were abandoned because they proved unworkable, ei-
ther to provide explanation in a given case, or guidance in future
decisions. 9 The poverty of nomenclature-based analysis894 in pro-
viding a workable definition of the enumerated powers is evident
from the endeavor in Carter v. Carter Coal Co. 95 to clarify the
"fundamental" distinction between direct and indirect effects of in-
trastate transactions upon interstate commerce:
390. The structural limitation of reserved state police power was cited in United States
v. De Witt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41, 45 (1869). DeWitt was the first case to hold legislation under
the commerce power unconstitutional. Interference with states' powers of economic regulation
has been the most frequently cited reason for invalidation of commerce power legislation. See
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S.
238, 299-304, 308 (1936); Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 546; Hammer, 247 U.S. at
273-76; Howard v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 207 U.S. 463, 502 (1908) ("Employers' Liability
Cases"); In re Heff, 197 U.S. 488, 505 (1905). The concept that the states retain a necessary
sphere of police power regulation immune from federal control was the mainspring driving the
semantic distinctions between "interstate commerce" and such "purely local" activities as man-
ufacturing, mining, and agricultural production. See United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156
U.S. 1, 13, 16 (1895). A similar external limitation was applied to restrict the federal taxing
power. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68, 72 (1936); Keller v. United States, 213
U.S. 138, 144 (1909).
391. The professed solicitude of the Court for reserved state powers was undermined by
its readiness to strike down state laws regulating labor and economic matters as violating sub-
stantive due process. See Tyson v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1927); Adkins v. Children's Hosp.,
261 U.S. 525 (1923); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897); cf. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton
R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 368 (1935) (invalidating federal legislation). The era of freewheeling
federal review of state economic legislation ended with the approval of state minimum wage
legislation in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
392. See Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 546.
393. Application of these tests has been criticized as an exercise that "rapidly collapsed
into a series of judicial ipse dixits which provided neither explanation for the decision in a
given case nor guidance for the future." Note, On Reading and Using the Tenth Amendment,
93 YALE L.J. 723, 729 n.37 (1984). See also Cox, supra note 378, at 225. Compare Garcia,
469 U.S. at 530-31, 539, 540-43 ("traditional government function test" is unworkable and
fails to provide an organizing principle that distinguishes between similar fact situations).
394. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 542 (former distinction between "governmental" and "pro-
prietary" functions abandoned as "untenable" constitutional distinction in tax immunity
cases).
395. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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The word "direct" implies that the activity or condition invoked
or blamed shall operate proximately-not medially, remotely, or
collaterally-to produce the effect. It connotes the absence of an
efficient intervening agency or condition. And the extent of the
effect bears no logical relation to its character. The distinction
between a direct and an indirect effect turns, not upon the mag-
nitude of either the cause or the effect, but entirely upon the
manner in which the effect has been brought about. . . . [T]he
matter of degree has no bearing upon the question here, since
that question is not-What is the extent of the local activity or
condition, or the extent of the effect produced upon interstate
commerce? but-What is the relation between the activity or
condition and the effect?""
This fundamental distinction, "essential to the maintenance of our
constitutional system, '3 97 but understandable, if at all, only by refer-
ence to metaphysics, epitomizes the shortcomings that infected the
judiciary's attempt to justify the often inconsistent constitutional re-
strictions imposed by parsing constitutional nomenclature."" This
distinction was soon abandoned'" in favor of Justice Holmes' rule
that "commerce among the States is not a technical legal conception,
but a practical one, drawn from the course of business."' 00
With its landmark decision in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.,"°1 upholding federal power to regulate manufacture by
preventing unfair labor practices affecting commerce, the Supreme
Court shattered the basis on which its previous restrictive decisions
had stood,40 ' and abandoned the internal semantic distinction be-
tween commerce and manufacturing as a definitional limit to the
commerce power.403 In returning to the principles of Gibbons,"" the
396. Id. at 307-08 (emphasis added).
397. Id. (quoting Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 548).
398. For judicial criticism of the unworkable distinction fashioned by the Court between
unconstitutional minimum wage legislation and permissible maximum hour provisions, see
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 395-96 (1937) and Justice Taft's dissenting
opinion in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 564 (1923).
399. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111, 122-23 (1942).
400. Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 398 (1905).
401. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
402. The existence of a limitation on the federal commerce power from the reserved
police powers of the states had been denied in Seven Cases v. United States, 239 U.S. 510,
514-15 (1916), and was repudiated in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 147
(1938) and Darby, 312 U.S. at 114.
403. 301 U.S. at 40 (fact that employees were involved in production not determinative
of federal commerce power). The remaining bulwarks against federal economic legislation col-
lapsed with Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (sustaining federal minimum wage and hour legislation;
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Court repudiated its practice of decision by labelling,4 " with the ob-
servation that "questions of the power of Congress are not to be de-
cided by reference to any formula which would give controlling force
to nomenclature such as 'production' and 'indirect' and foreclose con-
sideration of the actual effects of the activity in question upon inter-
state commerce."' ' By changing the focus of the judicial inquiry
from grammar to policy,4 7 the Court repudiated the concept that
narrow limits can be deduced from constitutional nomenclature, re-
turning to the reasoning of Justice Story in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee:40
8
The constitution unavoidably deals in general language. . . .It
could not be foreseen, what new changes and modifications of
power might be indispensable to effectuate the general objects of
the charter; and restrictions and specifications, which at the pre-
sent, might seem salutary, might, in the end, prove the over-
throw of the system itself. Hence, its powers are expressed in
general terms, leaving to the legislature, from time to time, to
adopt its own means to effectuate legitimate objects, and to
mould and model the exercise of its powers, as its own wisdom,
and the public interests, should require. 40
The Court also redefined the respective constitutional compe-
tencies of the legislative and judicial branches. 4 0 By renouncing the
judicial role as a "super-legislature," competent to substitute its own
overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (312 U.S. 116-17); and limiting
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (312 U.S. at 123)); United States v.
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942) (sustaining federal price regulation of milk in
intrastate commerce); and Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120 (sustaining federal regulation of agricul-
tural production).
404. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 122.
405. Id. at 122-23 (acknowledging that in some cases "the term 'direct' had been used
for the purpose of stating, rather than of reaching, a result"). Cf Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 543 (1985) (earlier attempts to explain distinction be-
tween "governmental" and "proprietary" functions "sound more of ipse dixit than of reasoned
explanation").
406. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120; see also id. at 124.
407. See BLACK, supra note 295, 23.
408. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
409. Id at 326-27.
410. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. at 129, where the Court further stated:
The conflicts of economic interest between the regulated and those who advan-
tage by it are wisely left under our system to resolution by the Congress under
its more flexible and responsible legislative process. Such conflicts rarely lend
themselves to judicial determination. And with the wisdom, workability, or fair-
ness, of the plan of regulation we have nothing to do.
(citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-15, 435-36 (1819), and Gibbons
v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824)).
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conclusion as to the wisdom or necessity of economic legislation"
under the guise of enforcing an internal limit imposed by judicial
definition, the Court has effectively removed both internal and struc-
tural limits upon the commerce power and left Congress solely ac-
countable to the electorate for its exercise.412
D. The Proposed Constitutional Limitation on the Patent Power
The suggestion in Graham' that a limitation on congressional
power under the intellectual property clause may be derived from its
statement of purpose "to promote the progress of . . . useful
arts,"""' is without counterpart in construction of the other article I,
section 8 powers and departs without explanation from the funda-
mental and opposite rule followed since McCulloch v. Maryland.1
Since McCulloch, the Court consistently has denied that statements
of purpose in conjunction with grants of legislative power impose
limitations on their exercise. It has done so in order to avoid restrict-
ing the enumerated constitutional powers to a scope narrower than
that required by the federal government to meet unforeseen circum-
stances.41" This great first principle of construction governs interpre-
tation of the plenary intellectual property power as well,417 and the
411. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). The Court stated:
The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial con-
ditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a
particular school of thought.
Id. at 488.
412. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551-55 (1985);
Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 350-51 (1904). See generally Wechsler, The
Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection
of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954); TRIBE, supra note 298, at 242-
43; Cox, supra note 378, at 200, 246.
413. 383 U.S. at 1.
414. Id. at 5-6.
415. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
416. See supra notes 316-19 and accompanying text. As Charles Black forcibly has
argued:
A federal government must be given powers broadly expressed and hence sus-
ceptible of great expansion; if this is not done, the federal government will not
be a workable structure, adequate to meet emergent need. Our national com-
merce and taxing powers are typical; neither text nor context will bear restric-
tive interpretation.
BLACK, supra note 295, at 28.
417. See, e.g., Mitchell Bros. Film Group v. Cinema Adult Theater, 604 F.2d 852 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980). In Mitchell Bros., the Court stated:
Congress has authority to make any law that is "necessary and proper" for the
execution of its enumerated Article I powers . . . including its copyright power,
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contrary suggestion in Graham is supported neither by history nor
public policy considerations.
The second implication of the Graham constitutional dictum,
that the judiciary has the primary authority to determine whether a
patentability standard "promotes the progress of . . . useful arts," is
an anachronism redolent of Lochner v. New York4" 8 and Hammer v.
Dagenhart.4 9 The essential question with respect to the statutory
standard of patentability is not whether the useful arts shall be pro-
moted, but what branch of the federal government is constitutionally
responsible for selecting the policy most suitable for carrying into
effect the enumerated power. From the standpoint of constitutional
theory developed since McCulloch, the central fallacy of this ap-
proach 410 is the assumption that if a constitutional limitation is in
fact expressed by the intellectual property clause statement of policy,
the Supreme Court is vested with constitutional authority to substi-
tute its judgment of whether a policy promotes the constitutional
purpose for that of Congress. The absence of any consideration of
the respective competencies of the judicial and legislative branches
renders the "implied limitation" construction of the intellectual
property clause anomalous in an era of judicial deference to the par-
ticular institutional abilities of the legislative branch when weighing
the practical consequences of alternative policy choices to advance
general constitutional goals.42 1
To cite a single example in the taxing power, it is inconceivable
since Steward Machine Co. v. Davis" that a tax would be struck
down by the Supreme Court on the basis that the taxation clause
affirmatively "requires that taxes advance the general welfare" or
that the statement of purpose establishes a "constitutional standard"
that permits review of tax measures based on the Court's impression
and the courts['] role in judging whether Congress has exceeded its Article I
powers is limited. The courts will not find that Congress has exceeded its power
so long as the means adopted by Congress for achieving a constitutional end are
"appropriate" and "plainly adapted" to achieving that end. McCulloch v. Ma-
ryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1891). It is by the lenient standard of
McCulloch that we must judge whether Congress has exceeded its constitutional
powers in enacting an all-inclusive copyright statute.
Id. at 860 (citations omitted). Accord Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 111 (D.C. Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948 (1982).
418. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
419. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
420. The approach was advocated by Justice Douglas in Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324
U.S. 370, 383-84 (1945) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
421. See infra notes 438-41 and accompanying text.
422. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
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of whether the welfare of the nation would be advanced or re-
tarded. 2" The approach suggested in Graham, by which the judici-
ary may interpose its independent assessment of whether a patenta-
bility standard will promote the progress of useful arts, is equally
inconsistent both, with precedent and the pragmatic policy requiring
deference to Congress in determining the measures that are necessary
and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers.
In distinction to the limitation inferred from the statement of
purpose, the Supreme Court in Graham does not suggest that the
nomenclature of the intellectual property clause imposes a minimum
patentability requirement by specifying that Congress shall have
power to secure to "inventors" exclusive rights in their "discoveries."
While the constitutional bifurcation between "writings" and "discov-
eries""4 may impose a structural limit on the intellectual property
power,425 contemporary constitutional theory provides no support for
the suggestion 42 that new and restrictive definitions of constitutional
terms such as "science," "author" or "inventor" may be coined by
the judiciary to limit congressional power under the intellectual
property clause. The drafters of the intellectual property clause
avoided use of the familiar terms "copyright" and "patent" with the
evident intention of avoiding restriction of the constitutional terms to
the established eighteenth-century forms of intellectual property,
and there is no warrant in constitutional law for substituting a nar-
row meaning for the necessarily general terms provided by the
Framers." 8
423. The judicial interpretation of the power granted by U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 to
impose taxes and pay debts to "provide for the common defence and general welfare of the
United States" has treated the term "provide for" as synonymous with "to promote" as used in
the intellectual property clause. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976); United States v.
Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 738 (1950); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548, 587 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936). The constitutional term "to
promote" is similarly general, having been equated with the words "to stimulate," "to en-
courage," or "to induce." Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973).
424. See supra note 96.
425. See supra notes 188-95 and accompanying text.
426. See cases cited supra note 260.
427. See Fenning, supra note 96, at 445. By contrast, the existing drafts of proposals for
the Constitution frequently refer to "patents" and "copyrights." Fenning, supra note 96, at
441-42.
428. See supra notes 404-09 and accompanying text. Much of the discussion regarding
a constitutional threshold standard of patentability has involved debate over the meaning as-
signed to the terms "science" and "inventor" at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.
See Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 393, 394-97 (1960); Seidel, The
Constitution and a Standard of Patentability, 48 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 5, 9-17 (1966); Irons &
Sears, The Constitutional Standard of Invention-The Touchstone for Patent Reform, 1973
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The vagaries inherent in a judicial labelling approach are indi-
cated by the divergent statutory interpretations of the two basic
terms of intellectual property law. The scope of "writings" has con-
tinuously been expanded by Congress and followed by the judici-
ary."" During the nineteenth century, the judicial definition of "in-
vention" followed an opposite course, progressively restricting the
term in its statutory context from a synonym for novelty (i.e., some-
thing not known or used before),' 80 to a discovery requiring the ex-
ercise of skill beyond that possessed by the ordinary artisan.'
Although limited to a statutory context, the divergent interpre-
tations of intellectual property nomenclature demonstrate the practi-
cal shortcomings of interpretations based on semantic, rather than
policy, considerations. 8  In the patent sphere, as in other article I,
section 8 contexts, reliance on a static formula that gives controlling
weight to judges' subjective definitions of nomenclature 43 3 such as
UTAH L. REV. 653.
429. See supra notes 145-65 and accompanying text.
430. See, e.g., McCormick v. Seymour, 15 F. Cas. 1322 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1851) (No.
8,726), rev'd on other grounds, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480 (1854); Washburn v. Gould, 29 F.
Cas. 312 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844) (No. 17,214); Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723 (C.C.D. Mass.
1840) (No. 18,107); Ryan v. Goodwin, 21 F. Cas. 110, 111 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No.
12,186); Earle v. Sawyer, 8 F. Cas. 254, 255-56 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (No. 4,247); Lowell v.
Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1020 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568).
431. Despite the holding in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851), it
was only after the Civil War that the nonobviousness determination came to be regularly
applied as a general condition of patentability. See, e.g., Slawson v. Grand St. R.R., 107 U.S.
649 (1883); Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192 (1883); Pearce v. Mulford, 102 U.S. 112,
118 (1880); Dunbar v. Myers, 94 U.S. 187, 197 (1876); Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347,
356 (1876); Union Paper Collar Co. v. Van Dusen, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 530, 562 (1875);
Hailes v. Van Wormer, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 353, 368, 374 (1874); Stimpson v. Woodman, 77
U.S. (10 Wall.) 117, 121 (1870).
432. The "patentable invention" standard created by the judiciary proved incapable of
explaining the decision in a case at issue, or of providing a workable standard for future
judicial application. In the view of an eminent patent judge, the judicially-fashioned require-
ment for "invention" "became the plaything of the judiciary and many judges delighted in
devising and expounding their own ideas of what it meant. This kind of mystical reasoning left
the judiciary free to indulge their personal whims about patentability." Rich, Laying the Ghost
of the 'Invention' Requirement, I AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J. 26, 31 (1972). Radical shifts in judicial
opinion left patent law with "no more stability than quicksand." Id. at n.7. Judge Learned
Hand similarly criticized judicial inconsistency in applying the standard, stating:
You could find nearly anything you liked if you went to the opinions. It was a
subject on which judges loved to be rhetorical. . . . [Platent lawyers . . . like to
quote all those things. There are lots of them. . . . They never seemed to tend
toward enlightenment.
Id. at n.5 (quoting Judge Hand's testimony in Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 92, 84th Cong.,
1st Sess. 113 (1955)).
433. It is ironic that Justice Black failed to appreciate that the "accordion-like" expan-
sion and contraction of constitutional terms by judicial definition and redefinition is as undesir-
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"inventor" and "author" could destroy the enumerated power, by
depriving the legislature of its constitutional "capacity to avail itself
of experience, to exercise its reason, and to accommodate its legisla-
tion to circumstances."' '
With respect to the intellectual property power, as well as the
other economic powers, pragmatic considerations along with the con-
stitutional structure defined in Gibbons 5 and McCulloch"3 6 require
that the primary responsibility for determining which laws and poli-
cies are necessary to carry out the enumerated powers belongs to
Congress, and that judicial review is properly limited to the question
of whether the means selected by Congress have a rational relation-
ship to the constitutional purpose.""
E. Congress' Rational Basis for Enactment of the Chip Act
Judicial deference to the legislature in determining the mea-
sures necessary and proper to carry into effect the economic powers
is the result of a realistic appraisal of the institutional abilities of
Congress. The Legislature is now acknowledged to be constitution-
ally vested with the responsibility to make policy decisions in carry-
ing the enumerated powers into effect,4 " because of its superior
factfinding ability,4 9 its accountability in the electoral process, 440
able in the article I, section 8 context, as it is in the others. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 177 (1952) (Black, J., concurring). Compare his remark that the due process clause is not
"a blank sheet of paper" left by the Framers for modern judges to inscribe their personal
notions "in accordance with their ideas of civilization's demands." West Virginia Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 643 (1943) (Black, J., concurring).
434. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 415 (1824).
435. Id.
436. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
437. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (quoted supra
note 220); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258-59 (1964). In determin-
ing the constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982),
prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations under the commerce power, the
Court indicated that "[t]he only questions are: (1) whether Congress had a rational basis for
finding that racial discrimination by motels affected commerce, and (2) if it had such a basis,
whether the means it selected to eliminate that evil are reasonable and appropriate." Id. at
258; accord Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 70 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring); Solorio v. United
States, 107 S. Ct. 2924, 2931 (1987).
438. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 547-55 (1985); Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429, 431 (1984).
439. This view has been developed at length by Archibald Cox, who concluded that the
legislature is a better factfinding body than an appellate court because of the greater number of
members, having a wider background and a more intimate knowledge of current social and
economic conditions, and the ability of legislative committees to develop the background facts
necessary for policy determinations in investigative proceedings. See Cox, supra note 378, at
209; Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80
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and its function of (at least to some extent) independently interpret-
ing the constitutional terms." 1 The importance of legislative
factfinding competency to Congress' primary constitutional role in
implementing the enumerated powers is underscored by the Chip
Act, where clear legislative articulation of the requirements of the
semiconductor industry provides a factual foundation for discussion
of the constitutional issues. Evidence presented in the hearings on
semiconductor protection legislation supports legislative determina-
tions that chips and mask works are purely utilitarian articles;"""
that their design is increasingly labor-intensive and costly with each
succeeding chip generation;" 8 that design developments are generally
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art;' that a period of exclu-
sivity is necessary to permit recovery of development costs;"' and
that the widespread practice of photographic copying has reduced the
period of exclusivity to far less than normal development 'time;" 6
thus preventing or threatening to prevent recovery of development
costs and inhibiting investment necessary for development of more
advanced chips."17
Based on these factual determinations, Congress considered and
balanced a number of competing policy issues in fashioning a sui
generis standard for mask works. These issues include the effect of
delay in obtaining exclusive rights, in view of the rapid development
and corresponding obsolescence of chip designs;" 8 the time period
HARv. L. REV. 91, 107 (1966). Justice Brennan adopted the view that "Itihe nature of the
judicial process makes it an inappropriate forum for the determination of complex factual
questions of the kind so often involved in constitutional adjudication. in Oregon v. Mitch-
ell, 400 U.S. 112, 247-48 (1970) (dissenting in part).
440. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-54.
441. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (holding that Congress has power
to determine that a state's English literacy voting requirement violates the fourteenth amend-
ment, even though the Supreme Court would have sustained the same law). See also Cox,
supra note 378, at 224-39; United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 87-88 (1936) (Stone, J.,
dissenting).
442. See supra notes 11, 41, 185-86 and accompanying text; House Report, supra note
9, at 3-4, 6,'8-10; Senate Report, supra note 9, at 6.
443. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text; Senate Report, supra note 9, at 5;
House Report, supra note 9, at 12.
444. See supra note 46 and accompanying text; Senate Report, supra note 9, at 8;
House Report, supra note 9, at 3.
445. See supra note 22 and accompanying text; Senate Report, supra note 9, at 5-6;
House Report, supra note 9, at. 2.
446. See supra note 16, 19-20 and accompanying text; House Report, supra note 9, at
2-3; Senate Report, supra note 9, at 5.
447. See supra notes 17 and 22 and accompanying text; House Report, supra note 9, at
3; Senate Report, supra note 9, at 5-6.
448. See Senate Report, supra note 9, at 8-9; House Report, supra note 9, at 25.
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necessary to permit recovery of development costs without stifling in-
novation;"" the scope of the exclusive right conferred (limited to re-
production, and not extending to use);' 50 and the competing interests
in reverse engineering. ' Of greatest importance for the present dis-
cussion is congressional consideration of the standard for protection,
somewhat greater than copyright originality but clearly less than
patent nonobviousness, upon which registrability of mask works is
conditioned. '52
Each of these factual and policy considerations is particularly
suitable for legislative determination. The prolonged debate over the
reverse engineering exception is illustrative.' 5 Opposition within the
semiconductor industry to the original bill resulted in significant lim-
itation of the scope of protection afforded by the Act, in particular,
by the reverse engineering provision.'" This restriction ensures in-
dustry access to developments embodied in registered works and is
conditioned only upon the method of reproduction employed. Such
tailoring of individual provisions required to balance competing eco-
nomic interests is beyond the self-acknowledged limitations of the ju-
diciary. 4 Based on similar considerations, it could not be declared
judicially that a term of ten years, as opposed to five, seventeen or
seventy-five years, would necessarily fail to promote the progress of
an admittedly useful art.'" Neither could the grant of absolute
rights, as opposed to those qualified by a reverse engineering excep-
tion, be imposed by the Court as an essential precondition of such
progress. Determinations of time limits on protection and of the con-
duct that will be exempt from infringement are economic matters so
clearly susceptible to a number of reasonable solutions that they are
now left to the political branch most capable of resolving such is-
449. See Senate Report, supra note 9, at 22-23; 1983 House Hearings, supra note 9, at
74.
450. See Senate Report, supra note 9, at 20-21; House Report, supra note 9, at 21
n.40; 1983 House Hearings, supra note 9, at 72-73 (first sale limitation).
451. See Senate Report, supra note 9, at 21-22; House Report, supra note 9, at 21-22;
House Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 24, at E4433.
452. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
453. See 1979 Hearing, supra note 9, at 51, 54, 57, 61, 69, 73, 75; 1983 House Hear-
ings, supra note 9, at 16-17, 34, 68, 71, 115; 1983 Senate Hearing, supra note 9, at 75-77, 83,
84-85, 100-101, 103-104, 110, 114; Senate Report, supra note 9, at 21-22.
454. See supra note 32.
455. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 545 (1985);
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-31, 732 (1963); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111,
129 (1942); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937); Helvering v. Davis,
301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824); Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415-16, 421 (1819).
456. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 51, 1.05[A] at 1-34.
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sues, 457 a point recently emphasized in Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios:4"
As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that
has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited
monopoly that should be granted to authors or to inventors in
order to give the public appropriate access to their work
product ...
Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent
deference to Congress when major technological innovations al-
ter the market for copyrighted materials. Congress has the con-
stitutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate
fully the varied permutations of competing interests that are in-
evitably implicated by such new technology." "
The same considerations apply to the standard of registrability.
In weighing the countervailing interests of rival chip producers and
the public interest in continued development of the United States
semiconductor industry, Congress was first required to create a stan-
dard that would not be impossible to satisfy, i.e., which would de-
mand only a degree of difference from the prior art attainable in the
industry. 460 The second criterion for a standard is that it not unduly
restrict the public domain by permitting appropriation of substan-
tially preexisting works." 1 In fashioning the Chip Act, Congress
achieved these competing goals by simultaneously reducing the stan-
dard for registrability46'" and the scope of protection conferred.46
Chip registration is easy to obtain and enforce, but relatively tooth-
less against any infringing activity except photocopying. The broad
reverse engineering exception permits expropriation of any improve-
ment or idea contained in a registered chip, so long as it can be
shown that the facially infringing chip was not photocopied but was
457. See cases cited supra note 455; Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining Ass'n, 452 U.S.
264, 276 (1981); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
458. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
459. Id. at 429-31. Compare Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518
(1972), in which the Court stated, "[tihe direction of Art. 1 is that Congress shall have the
power to promote the progress of science and the useful arts. When, as here, the Constitution
is permissive, the sign of how far Congress has chosen to go can come only from Congress."
Id. at 530; see also Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 562 (1973) (whether any specific
category of "writings" is to be protected by copyright "is left to the discretion of the
Congress").
460. See supra note 46.
461. See House Report, supra note 9, at 19.
462. See supra notes 63 and 73 and accompanying text.
463. See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
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the result of "study or analysis,""' thus providing the original devel-
oper with a decent interval to recover development costs in the mar-
ket.'" If the basic requirement for progress in the semiconductor
industry is a period of market exclusivity sufficient to recover devel-
opment costs, the Chip Act is admirably tailored to secure this result.
By restricting a competitor only to using essentially the same design
methods in order to copy a chip design, the Act attains its objective
with minimal restriction on the ideas available for free use by the
public. It is important to note that the flexibility required to fashion
such protection is denied to the legislative branch if the intellectual
property power is hemmed either by a threshold requirement of non-
obviousness, or by a minimum requirement of exclusivity.'" Judicial
imposition of either absolute requirement would frustrate rather
than promote the progress of the semiconductor art.
F. A Threshold Nonobviousness Standard Does Not Necessarily
Promote the Progress of Useful Arts
Constitutionalization of the nonobviousness requirement is ill-
advised on public policy grounds, since compelling public policy in-
terests may support the existence of limited exclusive rights "to pro-
mote the progress of. . . useful arts" even when the particular non-
obviousness requirement cannot be met. Accepting Congress' factual
determinations, once research and development costs exceed the rea-
sonable expectation of return in the marketplace, innovation in chips
and the progress of an extremely useful art' 6 will cease.'" Although
an inflexible threshold requirement of nonobviousness may promote
the useful arts in many instances, it has no intrinsic or necessary
relationship to the constitutional goal, since the promotion of very
useful arts may depend on sufficient legal protection to ensure recov-
464. See House Report, supra note 9, at 22. A detailed analysis of the reverse engineer-
ing exception is beyond the scope of the present article. However, the congressional emphasis
on the importance of a "paper trail" to the determination of legitimate reverse engineering as
opposed to "piracy" indicates that the legislative concern was primarily with the method of
copying employed, rather than the subject matter appropriated. See House Report, supra note
9, at 21-23; Senate Report, supra note 9, at 21-22.
465. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
466. See Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 423-24
(1908) (suggesting that the Constitution requires an absolute monopoly in the patent grant).
467. The world semiconductor market was estimated at 12.6 billion dollars annually in
1983, of which the United States controlled 67%. See 1983 House Hearings, supra note 9, at
65 (statement of G. Mossinghoff, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks); cf. Senate Re-
port, supra note 9, at 4 (16 billion dollar estimate).
468. See Senate Report, supra note 9, at 1, 5; House Report, supra note 9, at 2-3.
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ery of development costs, even when the developments individually
viewed may have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art.
In fashioning a constitutional patent policy that will genuinely
promote the progress of useful arts, the Court should avoid incorpo-
rating into the Constitution particular rules of Patent Office proce-
dure or other subtests useful in applying statutory standards. Of the
four standards suggested by Jefferson,"' none has survived even as a
statutory criterion. Combinations of old elements have always been
patentable.' 7 0 Nonobvious new uses'7 ' and substitutions of mate-
rial472 are now patentable. Changes of form or proportion are no
longer directly relevant patentability considerations.4"8 Constitution-
alizing any of these fossil requirements would have unnecessarily de-
prived the legislature of the ability to fashion a more comprehensive
standard. The same is true of the current statutory criterion of non-
obviousness, which may or may not ultimately prove to be a useful
adjunct in fulfilling the important public policy expressed in the in-
tellectual property clause.
Both from the standpoint of consistency in constitutional theory,
and to assure the preservation of federal power necessary to advance
the useful arts, Congress should be free to determine the patentabil-
ity standards necessary to promote the progress of useful arts, subject
only to the requirements that its decision and standard bear a ra-
tional relationship to this end, and respect the structural limitations
imposed by the division of copyright and patent powers within the
clause.' 7 '
469. The "general rules" described by Jefferson as applied under the 1790 Act are
summarized in Graham, 383 U.S. at 10 n.3. But cf. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of
1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 237, 244 n.15 (1936).
470. The rule urged by Jefferson against patenting a combination of old elements was
never applied by the courts. See, e.g., Hovey v. Henry, 12 F. Cas. 603, 604 (C.C.D. Mass.
1846) (No. 6,742); Ryan v. Goodwin, 21 F. Cas. 110, 111 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 12,186);
Earle v. Sawyer, 8 F. Cas. 254 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (No. 4,247); Pennock v. Dialogue, 19 F.
Cas. 171, 173 (C.C.E.D. Penn. 1825) (No. 10,941), affd, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829); Lowell v.
Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1020 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568).
471. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1982) defines the term "process" as including "a new use of a
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material." See Federico, Com-
mentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 16-17 (1954); H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1952); In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1002-03 (C.C.P.A. 1972).
472. The holding in Hotchkiss was tempered in Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite
Co., 93 U.S. 486 (1877), which found considerations of long-felt need and commercial success
to be decisive in favor of patentability in the case of substituting a cheap, durable, and elastic
material-vulcanized rubber-for gold plates earlier used in forming the plate and gums to
which artificial teeth are attached. Id. at 495.
473. This criterion was abandoned in the Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117.




If, as indicated in Graham ,'7 5 a minimum standard equivalent
to nonobviousness is a constitutional requirement for legislation se-
curing exclusive rights in a useful article, the Chip Act is unconstitu-
tional for failing to require a commensurate standard in securing ex-
clusive rights in mask works. However, repeated constitutional
adjudication of the parallel and plenary article I, section 8 powers,
as augmented by the necessary and proper clause, has established
that limitations are not to be implied from the grants of enumerated
powers, and that a clear limitation must be found elsewhere within
the confines of the Constitution in order to limit the otherwise un-
restricted discretion of Congress in determining the measures and
policies necessary to carry the enumerated powers into effect. The
limitation discovered in the statement of purpose of the intellectual
property clause has no history in United States patent law, and is
inconsistent with the fundamental principles which have governed
construction of the other article I, section 8 economic powers. The
long history of contradictory and refuted policies embraced by the
patent acts indicates that neither the progress of the useful arts, nor
the Constitution itself, is likely to be promoted by judicial restriction
of the enumerated patent power, in an attempt to immortalize any
personal or currently fashionable theory of the public interests served
by protecting intellectual property.
475. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
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